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A direct consequence of imposing a ceiling on the price of a good for which secondary markets do
not exist, is that, when there is excess demand, the good will not be allocated to the buyers who value
it the most. The resulting allocative cost has been discussed in the literature as a potentially important
component of the total welfare loss from price ceilings, but its practical importance has yet to be established
empirically. In this paper, we address this question using data for the U.S. residential market for natural
gas which was subject to price ceilings during 1954-1989. This market is well suited for such an empirical
analysis and natural gas price ceilings affected millions of households. Using a household-level, discrete-continuous
model of natural gas demand, we estimate that the allocative cost in the U.S. residential market for
natural gas averaged $4.6 billion annually since the 1950s, effectively tripling previous estimates of
the net welfare loss to U.S. consumers. We quantify the evolution of this allocative cost and its geographical
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A large literature in economics examines the welfare costs of price ceilings. Among the markets
that have received the most attention are rental housing, telecommunications, insurance, energy,
and health care.1 In traditional welfare analysis, price ceilings reduce the quantity transacted
below the competitive level, imposing deadweight losses on both buyers and sellers. In this paper
we concentrate on an additional component of welfare loss that is often ignored. Notably, when
there is excess demand for a good for which secondary markets do not exist, a welfare loss occurs
when the good is not allocated to the buyers who value it the most. This allocative cost has been
studied, for example, by Glaeser and Luttmer (2003), but its practical importance has yet to be
established empirically.2
Our analysis focuses on price ceilings in the U.S. residential market for natural gas in the post-
war period. This market is a good candidate for an empirical study of allocative costs for several
reasons. First, natural gas is a homogeneous good, eliminating the concerns about diﬀerences
in quality that complicate the estimation of allocative costs in other markets. Second, whereas
secondary markets may act to mitigate the costs of misallocation in some markets such as rental
housing, there are no resale markets for natural gas. Third, the residential market for natural gas
aﬀects millions of consumers suggesting that allocative costs could be very large. Fourth, this mar-
ket was continuously regulated between 1954 and 1989 before experiencing complete deregulation.
This allows us to observe market behavior both under regulation and in the absence of regulation.
Fifth, the fact that some states remained unregulated throughout this period allows us to evaluate
the out-of-sample ﬁt of our model in settings where markets operate freely. These markets also
allow us to assess the evidence for possible structural changes in the model parameters. Sixth,
this market lends itself to empirical analysis, given the availability of unusually comprehensive
household-level data by state and year as well as the corresponding state-level price data.
We construct estimates of the allocative costs associated with the regulation of natural gas
1See, for example, Hayek (1931), Olsen (1972), Smith and Phelps (1978), Raymon (1983), Frech and Lee (1987)
and MacAvoy (2000). A closely related literature studies the welfare costs of minimum wage legislation in labor
markets (see, e.g., Holzer, Katz and Krueger (1991); Card and Krueger (1994).)
2The problem of allocative costs is aptly described in Friedman and Stigler (1946). An early theoretical treatment
can be found in Weitzman (1977). The analogous problem of misallocation due to minimum wages has been discussed
as early as Welch (1974) and has been studied in Luttmer (2007). Allocative costs should not be confused with
allocated costs, a legal term used by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to describe average cost pricing. We
prefer the term “allocative cost” also to the term “allocative ineﬃciency” as used by Viscusi, Harrington and Vernon
(2005) because the latter does not distinguish between physical shortages and the economic costs associated with the
misallocation. Likewise, we do not use the term “distributional ineﬃciency” which is sometimes used to refer to the
equalization of the marginal rate of substitution across consumers because it evokes images of income redistribution.
1prices based on several alternative thought experiments. Our baseline thought experiment exploits
the fact that by the 1990s, the natural gas market had been completely deregulated and, unlike
during the period of regulation, all households wanting to adopt natural gas heating systems were
able to make that choice. Our empirical strategy is to ask how much natural gas would have been
consumed in 1950-2000 based on the household preferences revealed in the 1990s data. Comparing
households’ actual choices with what they would have liked to choose in an unconstrained world,
as implied by an economic model of consumer choice, allows us to calculate physical shortages of
natural gas and to measure the allocative cost of price ceilings.
Our paper provides for the ﬁrst time a detailed picture of the evolution of physical shortages in
the U.S. natural gas market during the post-war period. Whereas previous studies have traditionally
measured the degree of disequilibrium in the natural gas market using shortfalls in contractually-
obligated deliveries to pipelines, our measure of the physical shortage correctly incorporates not
only demand from existing delivery contracts, but the unrealized demand from prospective new
customers as well.3 This distinction is particularly important in the residential market because
shortages were accommodated by restricting access to potential new customers rather than by
rationing existing users. Thus, rationing took place on the extensive rather than the intensive
margin. We ﬁnd that during the period 1950-2000 demand for natural gas exceeded observed sales
of natural gas by an average of 20.3%, with the largest shortages during the 1970s and 1980s.
Compared to previous studies, we ﬁnd that the shortages began earlier, lasted longer, and were
larger in magnitude.
Physical shortages are important in describing the eﬀect of price ceilings, but in themselves do
not provide a measure of economic costs. Using a household-level, discrete-continuous model of
natural gas demand following Dubin and McFadden (1984) we estimate that the allocative cost
from price ceilings averaged $4.6 billion annually in the U.S. residential market during 1950-2000.4
While this estimate may appear large, alternative (if less credible) identifying strategies using gas-
exporting states yield estimates about twice as large, leading us to interpret the baseline estimate
as a conservative lower bound on the allocative cost. Because this allocative cost arises in addition
to the conventional deadweight loss, our estimates imply that total welfare losses from natural
3For example, Vietor (1984) reports that shortfalls in contractually-obligated deliveries to pipelines increased
steadily beginning in 1970, reaching approximately 3 trillion cubic feet in 1976. This is a signiﬁcant amount considering
that total natural gas consumption in the U.S. in that year was 20 trillion. As large as these curtailments were, results
from our model suggest that they understate the true level of disequilibrium in the market because they fail to account
for demand from prospective new customers.
4All dollar amounts are expressed in year 2000 dollars.
2gas regulation were considerably larger than previously believed. Moreover, our household-level
approach provides insights into the distributional eﬀects of regulation that could not have been
obtained using a model based on national or even regional data. In particular, we are able to
identify which states were the biggest losers from regulation. We show that the allocative cost
of regulation was borne disproportionately by households in the Northeast, Midwest, and South
Atlantic states. We compare the geographic distribution of allocative cost to Congressional voting
patterns and document that regulation was primarily supported by Senators from states in the
Northeast and Midwest whose constituents ended up bearing a disproportionately large share of
the allocative cost.5
Our analysis has several policy implications. First, regulators need to be aware that price
ceilings only beneﬁt consumers that have access to regulated markets. When there is a shortage
of a good, not all consumers will have access to the market, and those who have access will not
necessarily be the consumers who value the good the most. Second, the adverse eﬀects of price
ceilings can last much longer than the regulatory policies themselves. With natural gas, since
households change heating systems infrequently, households who are barred from adopting natural
gas heating systems because of a price ceiling will continue to use inferior technologies for years to
come. This lock-in eﬀect helps explain the persistence and the magnitude of the allocative costs
that we ﬁnd, and highlights the diﬃculty of predicting the duration of the eﬀects of price regulation.
Third, our analysis underscores the diﬃculty of determining in advance how the allocative cost of
price regulation will be distributed geographically.
The format of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a description of regulation in the U.S.
natural gas industry since the 1930s, emphasizing characteristics of the regulating policies that are
relevant to our analysis. Section 3 describes a model of price ceilings. We demonstrate the existence
of an allocative cost from price ceilings in addition to the conventional deadweight welfare loss for
goods for which there is no secondary market. Sections 4 and 5 introduce our household-level
model of demand for natural gas and discuss its empirical implementation. In section 6, we discuss
5Our analysis is germane to a substantial literature that examines regulation in the U.S. natural gas industry.
Early studies such as MacAvoy (1971), MacAvoy and Pindyck (1973), Breyer and MacAvoy (1973) and MacAvoy and
Pindyck (1975) document gas shortages in the early 1970s and use structural dynamic simultaneous equation models
to simulate hypothetical paths for prices, production and reserves under alternative regulatory regimes. Subsequent
studies by Sanders (1981), MacAvoy (1983), Braeutigam and Hubbard (1986), Kalt (1987), Bradley (1996) and
MacAvoy (2000) describe the regulatory policies in the natural gas market since the 1970s and provide further
documentation of shortages. Several of these studies present estimates of the deadweight loss from natural gas price
ceilings, but only Braeutigam and Hubbard (1986) and Viscusi, Harrington and Vernon (2005) discuss the issue of
allocative cost. Our study is the ﬁrst to quantify the size of this allocative cost and to assess its evolution over time
and its geographic distribution across states during the post-war period.
3the estimates of physical shortages and allocative cost. We study both the within-state allocation
of natural gas and the allocation across states. The allocative cost arising from misallocations
across states can be readily computed by comparing the actual allocation with the hypothetical
allocation under eﬃcient rationing. An inherent diﬃculty with modeling the within-state allocation
of natural gas during shortages is that the data do not allow us to distinguish between households
who chose not to use natural gas and households who were rationed out of the market. Consistent
with evidence presented in section 6.2 we assume that the within-state allocation among households
interested in acquiring natural gas is random. In section 6.5 we evaluate the out-of-sample ﬁt of the
model, and in section 6.6 we examine the sensitivity of the estimates of allocative cost to alternative
modeling assumptions. Section 7 contains concluding remarks.
2 History of Natural Gas Regulation in the U.S.
The natural gas market in the United States consists of three main players: gas producers,
interstate pipeline companies, and local distributors. Most natural gas in the United States is
produced in gas ﬁelds concentrated in the Southwest, whereas most consumption takes place in the
Midwest and Northeast. Gas producers are responsible for exploring for and producing natural gas.
Interstate pipeline companies buy natural gas from producers at the wellhead and deliver it to the
consuming areas in exchange for a markup on wellhead prices. Local distributors in turn purchase
natural gas from the interstate pipelines at wholesale prices, and distribute it to retail customers
subject to an additional mark-up.
Each of the three main players in the natural gas market faced diﬀerent regulatory constraints
in the post-war period. Throughout this period, local gas distributors were regulated at the state
level. Pipeline companies that transported gas across state lines were regulated at the federal level
by the Natural Gas Act of 1938, following the well-established model of public utilities. Finally,
until the early 1950s, producers of natural gas were unregulated. By all accounts natural gas
producers were operating in a competitive market. In 1953, the 30 largest gas producers controlled
less than half of all proved reserves, and accounted for only one third of sales to interstate pipelines
(see Vietor 1984). In the same year, the largest four ﬁrms produced 17% of the national output
and the largest 44 ﬁrms produced 73% (see Lindahl 1956).6 Neuner (1960) based on an in-depth
6Similarly, Cookenboo (1958) ﬁnds that around 1954 the twenty largest gas producing ﬁrms represent 54% of the
volume of total contracts for interstate sales, 54% of total production, and 55% of total undeveloped acreage under
lease. Cookenboo (1958, p. 79-80) points out that these ﬁgures indicate that, “...about three-fourths of manufacturing
industries are more concentrated than is the ﬁeld market for natural gas... No one ﬁrm is several times larger than
4study of national as well as regional markets rejects the claim that the Southwestern gas market
was not competitive in 1953.
The major problem in the natural gas industry in the 1930s and 1940s had been one of over-
production. This situation changed in the 1950s. As the pipeline system expanded, supply could
barely keep up with rising demand for natural gas among urban consumers in the Midwest and
Northeast. Supply of natural gas was concentrated in four southwestern states. By 1953/54, Texas,
Louisiana, Oklahoma and New Mexico provided 79% of all marketed gas production and about the
same percentage of interstate shipments.7
As the demand for natural gas increased faster than supplies in the early 1950s, gas prices
were rising rapidly much to the dismay of consumer advocates. Pressures arose to broaden the
interpretation of the meaning of the Natural Gas Act in an eﬀort to stem these price increases. Since
the legislature was not sympathetic to an expansion of federal control over natural gas resources, the
courts became the focal point of this eﬀort. In 1954, the Supreme Court reviewed the case of Phillips
Petroleum Company vs. Attorney General of Wisconsin. Phillips’ prices had been increasing and
higher wellhead prices (which in turn were responsible for higher retail prices) were alleged to be
contrary to the interests of consumers in Wisconsin and in violation of the Natural Gas Act of
1938. The question of whether Phillips was guilty of pricing above competitive market levels, as
the plaintiﬀs asserted, was never assessed by the court, but the court ruled that independent gas
producers that sold their gas production to unaﬃliated interstate pipeline companies were subject
to the 1938 Natural Gas Act and should be regulated as public utilities. This court decision
brought independent natural gas producers under the regulatory umbrella of the Federal Power
Commission (FPC) (see Sanders 1981).8 In practice, the FPC’s implementation of the Supreme
Court decision involved the imposition of price ceilings and a transfer of wealth from gas producers
in the Southwest to consumers across the country. Federal price controls on natural gas sold in the
interstate market stimulated consumer demand, while at the same time discouraging supply. The
natural consequence was a shortage of natural gas.
In the late 1950s, the cost of new exploration increased faster than gas prices. It became
the next smaller, and there are many of suﬃciently large size relative to the largest to create signiﬁcant competition
for it. Under these conditions it would be almost inconceivable that any one seller could have any signiﬁcant inﬂuence
over price”.
7Natural gas is more expensive to transport than oil and thus most natural gas consumed in the U.S. is produced
in North America. Net imports of natural gas increased from less than 1% in 1950 to 15.2% in 2000, but 94% of the
natural gas imports in 2000 came from Canada (see E.I.A. 2006d, table 6.3).
8This ruling contrasts with the court’s earlier position in Federal Power Commission vs. Hope Natural Gas
Company, 320 U.S. 591 (1944) in which the Supreme Court supported the FPC’s jurisdiction over interstate sales of
natural gas, but continued to restrict the FPC from exerting authority over natural gas production.
5increasingly costly for gas producers to locate new reserves, but FPC regulated prices made no
allowance for rising costs of exploration. As a result, the reserves-to-production ratio dropped
from 18.5 in 1966 to 15.5 in 1968 and 8.5 in 1977 (see MacAvoy 1983, p.90). Early warnings
about impending shortages in the gas market were dismissed. Actual curtailments of gas supplied
to industrial customers began in 1970, and by 1974 service to industrial customers in interstate
markets had been widely curtailed. A further complication arose from the fact that the FPC’s
jurisdiction did not extend to gas sold within gas-producing states. The existence of an unregulated
intrastate gas market worsened the shortage in the FPC controlled interstate market. Whereas in
1970 the average price of gas in the regulated interstate and the unregulated intrastate markets
was virtually identical, by 1972, the FPC was holding wellhead prices for interstate delivery well
below the levels observed in the unregulated intrastate markets, and increasingly so over time.9
Given the price diﬀerential between regulated interstate and unregulated intrastate markets, gas
producers in the Southwest sold as much gas as possible to higher paying intrastate customers,
adding to the shortage of natural gas in the Midwest and Mid-Atlantic region. Whereas in the
1964-1969 period, gas producers dedicated 67% of their new reserves to the interstate market, in
1970-1973 that ﬁgure fell to 8%.10
From September 1976 to August 1977, net curtailments of contracted interstate gas deliveries
amounted to 20% of all supplies (see Braeutigam and Hubbard 1986). Prospects of increasing
shortages brought the issue of natural gas regulation back before the legislature. The regulatory
turmoil of the 1970s ultimately led to the passage of the Natural Gas Policy Act in 1978, which
speciﬁed a phased deregulation of most prices for gas discovered after 1976. The 1978 Act was a
political compromise intended to reduce shortages without completely eliminating the distortions
of the old pricing system. After 1978, natural gas prices temporarily spiked, supplies expanded and
curtailments were eliminated, but it was only in 1989 that all forms of regulation of gas producers
were oﬃcially terminated (see Bradley 1996).
Thus, residential natural gas prices in the United States were subject to price ceilings during
a 35-year period from 1954 to 1989. The purpose of this paper is to quantify the allocative costs
associated with these price ceilings. We exploit the fact that by the 1990s, natural gas was widely
available in the U.S. and, unlike in previous decades, households wanting to adopt natural gas
heating systems were able to make that choice. Even in the 1950s, prior to regulation, households
9See, e.g., Braeutigam and Hubbard (1986, p.143) and MacAvoy (1983, p. 91).
10See Braeutigam and Hubbard (1986, p.146). Vietor (1984, p. 289) reports somewhat higher shares in the later
period.
6wanting natural gas faced constraints, as gas producers could not keep up with rising demand (see,
e.g., American Gas Association (1951, p. 158)). Our empirical strategy is to ask how much natural
gas would have been consumed in 1950-2000 based on choices made by households living in homes
built during the 1990s. Controlling for the covariates that aﬀect heating demand, these choices allow
the estimation of household preferences. This strategy addresses one of the central diﬃculties in
estimating the allocative cost of price ceilings. In particular, during periods of price regulation, one
only observes households’ behavior under the constraints imposed by regulation, making it diﬃcult
to identify households’ unconstrained preferences. Our study sidesteps this diﬃculty by taking
advantage of the fact that in the 1990s we observe unconstrained household behavior. Comparing
households’ actual choices with what they would have liked to choose in an unconstrained world
as implied by the model, allows us to measure the allocative cost of price ceilings. In the following
sections we develop this empirical strategy in more detail. We investigate the sensitivity of our
results to alternative thought experiments in Section 6.6, where we also address the possibility that
household preferences and heating characteristics may have changed over time.
3 Price Ceilings and Allocative Cost
Figure 1 describes the standard problem of imposing a price ceiling. At the competitive equi-
librium, the market clears with price P∗ and quantity Q∗. Now consider the eﬀect of a price ceiling
P∗∗ imposed below P∗. The price ceiling reduces output to Q∗∗. At this level of output demand
D(P∗∗) exceeds supply S(P∗∗). Compared to the competitive equilibrium, households gain P∗deP∗∗
from paying P∗ −P∗∗ less per unit but lose triangle bcd because of the decrease in quantity. Firms
are unambiguously worse oﬀ, losing P∗deP∗∗ because of the decrease in price and dce because of
the decrease in quantity. Total deadweight loss is bce.
The welfare cost of price ceilings, however, is not necessarily limited to this triangle. Upon
further inspection it becomes clear that welfare losses will be limited to the deadweight loss triangle
bce if and only if the good is allocated to the buyers who value it the most. Under eﬃcient rationing,
buyers represented on the demand curve between a and b receive the good, while those represented
by the demand curve between b and f do not. In some markets it may be reasonable to assume
that a good is allocated eﬃciently. For example, when there is a secondary market where goods can
be resold, this secondary market ensures that buyers with the highest willingness to pay receive the
good. However, in many markets such as the market for natural gas there is no mechanism that
7ensures that customers with the highest reservation price will receive the good. In these markets
the welfare costs of price regulation also depend on how the good is allocated. Ineﬃcient rationing
imposes additional welfare costs.
A commonly used benchmark in illustrating these additional welfare costs is the case in which
goods are allocated randomly to buyers (see ﬁgure 2).11 The random allocation is ineﬃcient because
it does not allocate goods to buyers with the highest willingness-to-pay. At the price ceiling P∗∗,
demand for the good is D(P∗∗), but supply is only Q∗∗. If supply is allocated randomly then only
a fraction
Q∗∗
D(P ∗∗) of buyers with a reservation price above P∗∗ will be able to buy the good. This
random allocation is depicted by the curve
Q∗∗
D(P ∗∗)D(P). Now, in addition to the deadweight loss,
bce, there is an additional welfare loss, abe, that is the result of the loss of eﬃciency from not
allocating the good to the consumers with the highest reservation price. This additional welfare
loss represents the “allocative cost” of regulation in this example.
In practice, the level of the allocative cost will depend not only on how the good is rationed,
but also on the distribution of reservation prices across households. The distribution of reservation
prices across households is reﬂected in the slope of the demand curve. If all households have
identical reservation prices there will be no welfare costs from misallocation. Allocative costs arise
because household preferences and technologies are heterogeneous. In the market for natural gas
this heterogeneity arises mainly for two reasons. First, there are diﬀerences across households in
preferences for diﬀerent types of heating systems. For example, households diﬀer in how much
they value the cleanliness and convenience of natural gas. Second, households diﬀer in how much
they value diﬀerent heating systems because of technological considerations. Compared to electric
heating systems, natural gas and oil heating systems are expensive to purchase but inexpensive to
operate. As a result, households with high levels of demand for home heating tend to prefer natural
gas and heating oil.
The conventional deadweight loss depends on the location and shape of the demand curve as
well as the location and shape of the supply curve. In contrast, the allocative cost only depends
on the location and shape of the demand curve and the equilibrium level of price and quantities,
but not on the shape of the supply curve. Accordingly, our analysis abstracts from the supply side
of the natural gas market. Our conclusions do not depend on the shape of the supply curve but
they do depend on the observed level of natural gas sales by state, as well as observed prices by
11This analysis follows closely Braeutigam and Hubbard (1986), Glaeser and Luttmer (2003) and Viscusi, Harring-
ton and Vernon (2005).
8state. These data allow us to determine the magnitude of natural gas shortages by state and year,
and to calculate the allocative cost conditional on the historically observed level of natural gas
consumption. Given that households with access to natural gas were never rationed, as discussed
in Section 6.2, our estimates of allocative cost are based on variations in the extensive margin (i.e.,
the choice of heating system) rather than the intensive margin (i.e., gas consumption conditional
on having opted for a gas heating system). A limitation of our approach is that we cannot calculate
a conventional measure of deadweight loss. For estimates of the deadweight loss see MacAvoy and
Pindyck (1975) and MacAvoy (2000). With our model we are able to simulate demand for natural
gas at the prices actually observed in the market during this period and calculate shortages, but
we are not able to say what equilibrium price levels would have prevailed without price ceilings
or under alternative forms of regulation. The latter question indeed is of no relevance for the
measurement of the allocative cost.12
4 Residential Demand For Natural Gas
This section describes a model of residential demand for natural gas. The demand for heating
equipment and the demand for heating fuels (natural gas, electricity, and heating oil) are modeled
jointly as the solution to a household production problem. Households make two choices. First,
households decide which heating system to purchase. Because this decision involves a substantial
capital investment, households change heating systems infrequently. Second, conditional on the
choice of the heating system, households decide how much heating fuel to purchase.
Joint discrete-continuous models of the form described in this section have been the standard
for modeling energy demand at the household-level since Hausman (1979), Dubin and McFadden
(1984) and Dubin (1985). Dubin and McFadden (1984) were among the ﬁrst to illustrate the
diﬃculties in modeling energy demand with cross-sectional data. In particular, because households
choose which heating system to purchase, dummy variables for ownership of particular types of
heating systems must be treated as endogenous in energy demand equations. Their approach of
using a discrete choice model to address this simultaneity has been widely adopted by more recent
studies of residential energy demand such as Bernard, Bolduc and Belanger (1996), Goldberg (1998),
12Even though the volume of natural gas available is ﬁxed under the thought experiment of reallocating gas across
households, the demand for heating oil relative to electricity could change as natural gas is reallocated. Since our
analysis abstracts from the supply side of the electricity and heating oil markets, we are not able to say how these
changes in turn might aﬀect the demand for natural gas. However, there is reason to believe that this type of feedback
would have been limited by the structure and regulatory environment of these markets.
9Nesbakken (2001), West (2004), Feng, Fullerton, and Gan (2005), and Mansur, Mendelsohn and
Morrison (2008).
Following Dubin and McFadden (1984), households are assumed to maximize an indirect utility






+ α1jpsj + γjwi + βjyi + ηi
￿
e−βjpsj + ǫij (1)
where i indexes households, j ∈ {1,...,J} indexes the heating system alternatives, psj is the price
in state s for heating fuel j, wi is a vector of household characteristics and yi is household income.
The key parameter in the heating-system choice model is α1j. This parameter, which is assumed
to be constant across households, reﬂects households’ willingness to trade oﬀ the price of a heating
fuel for other heating system characteristics. The parameter α0j captures heating-system speciﬁc
factors such as purchase and installation costs as well as preferences for a particular heating system
that are common across households. For example, many households value the fact that natural gas
is a cleaner-burning fuel than oil. The parameter βj captures the eﬀect of income on the relative
desirability of diﬀerent heating systems. The household-speciﬁc component, ηi, reﬂects unobserved
diﬀerences across households in the demand for heat. The error, ǫij, captures unobserved diﬀerences
across households’ preferences for particular heating systems. For example, households diﬀer in how
much they value the convenience and safety of natural gas heating.
The probability that household i selects alternative k is the probability of drawing {ǫi1,ǫi2,...,ǫiJ}
such that Uik ≥ Uij ∀j  = k. We assume that ǫij has a type 1 extreme value/Gumbel distribution
and is i.i.d. across households and heating systems. Under this assumption, the probability that
household i selects heating system k takes the well-known conditional logit form
Pik =
exp{α0k + α1k





βj + α1jpsj + γjwi + βjyi}
.13 (2)
Since choice probabilities are invariant to additive scaling of utility, in expression (2) we omit factors
that are identical across alternatives. Choices are also invariant to multiplicative scaling of utility,
13An important property of the conditional logit model is independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) which
follows from this assumption that ǫij is independent across alternatives. This is likely to be a reasonable approximation
in models such as ours which allow the utility of alternatives to depend on a rich set of covariates. Moreover, Monte-
Carlo evidence from Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand (2004) indicates that even when the IIA property is
violated, the Dubin and McFadden conditional logit approach tends to perform well.
10so we follow the standard convention of normalizing the variance of the error term.14
Applying Roy’s Identity to the indirect utility function (1) yields the heating demand function




= α0k + α1kpsk + γkwi + βkyi + ηi, (3)
where xik denotes annual demand for heating fuel k, measured in British Thermal Units, or BTUs.
Equation (3) illustrates that demand depends on psk, household income and household character-
istics including weather, household demographics and features of the home such as the number of
rooms.
This framework takes into account the correlation between the utilization and heating system
choice decisions by allowing the unobserved household-speciﬁc component of natural gas demand
to be correlated with the unobserved determinants of heating system choice. This correlation
might arise for many reasons. Most importantly, households who prefer warm homes are likely
both to choose natural gas heating systems and to use high levels of natural gas. As a result, the
distribution of ηi among households who select natural gas may not be the same as the unconditional
distribution of ηi. Dubin and McFadden (1984) address this endogeneity problem by postulating
that the expected value of ηi is a linear function of {ǫi1,ǫi2,...,ǫiJ} and using the density of the
extreme value distribution to evaluate the conditional expectation of ηi analytically.15 They derive
a set of selection correction terms that are functions of the predicted choice probabilities from the
household choice model. When these terms are included in the heating demand function (3) the
parameters α0k, α1k, γk and βk can be estimated consistently.16
Our speciﬁcation follows previous studies (see Hausman 1979, Dubin and McFadden 1984,
Goldberg 1998 and Mansur, Mendelsohn and Morrison 2008) in assuming that current prices are
a reasonable proxy for future prices. This assumption is natural when energy prices are well
14In addition, we follow the approach described by Mannering and Winston (1985) and followed by Goldberg (1998)
of subsuming e
−βjpsj into the error term ǫij.
15An alternative to using the conditional logit model would have been to estimate the heating-system choice model
based on a multinomial probit speciﬁcation allowing the unobserved diﬀerences across households, ǫij, to be arbitrarily
correlated across alternatives. However, in that case the conditional expectation of ηi no longer would have a closed
form, thus precluding the standard approach of using selection terms to address the endogeneity issue. This fact
prompted Dubin and McFadden to adopt the logit model.
16Following Dubin and McFadden (1984) and many subsequent studies including Goldberg (1998), West (2004),
and Mansur, Mendelsohn, and Morrison (2008) we do not restrict parameters appearing in (2) to be identical to
the parameters appearing in (3). Imposing this type of restriction not only would be computationally diﬃcult, but
the level of the parameters in the conditional logit model (2) is not identiﬁed, making it impossible to impose this
restriction without further assumptions.
11approximated by a random walk and changes in energy prices are unpredictable. In most contexts
this will be a reasonable assumption, although a case could be made that during the late 1970s
when deregulation was imminent, it might have been reasonable to expect natural gas prices to
increase.17
5 Empirical Implementation
Our study is the ﬁrst to use household-level data to analyze the eﬀects of regulation in the
natural gas market. The estimation of the model is based on a data set that we compiled from
industry sources, governmental records and the U.S. Census 1960-2000. The 1960-2000 U.S. Cen-
sus provides a forty-year history of household heating fuel choices, household demographics, and
housing characteristics. Another important component of the analysis is the development of a
matching data set of energy prices. We put considerable eﬀort into constructing a 50-year panel of
state-level residential prices for natural gas, electricity, and heating oil. This data set, together with
the Census data, makes it possible to represent formally the alternatives available to households in
the U.S. during this period.
5.1 Data
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. The data come from a variety of sources. Heating system
choices, energy expenditures, household demographics and housing characteristics come from the
U.S. Census of 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000.18 The Census is the only household-level dataset
17One might also be concerned about changes in the volatility of heating fuel prices impacting the relative desir-
ability of alternative heating systems. This is not a concern that can be addressed in the present framework. We
also are implicitly assuming that households do not take future changes in household characteristics such as changes
in household size into account when making decisions. Finally, we are assuming that observed choices reﬂect the
preferences of the household and not preferences of some other party. In the case where home builders or landlords
are involved, we assume that the relevant market is suﬃciently competitive so that these parties act eﬀectively as
agents for the household. Although these assumptions are standard in this literature, there is reason to believe that
they are unduly restrictive, and it will be important to relax these assumptions in future work. Finally, we do not
allow the tradeoﬀ between heating systems to depend on the real interest rate. When real interest rates are high,
households may be more reluctant to invest in expensive natural gas heating systems whose cost savings accrue only
gradually over many years. Controlling for the real interest rate is not feasible in our framework because it would
require the estimation of the heating-system choice model during the years for which we do not observe household
choices in the absence of regulation.
18The U.S. Census sample come from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series. We use the 1960 1% sample, the
1970 1% Form 1 State sample, the 1980 5% sample, the 1990 5% sample, and the 2000 5% sample. All are national
random samples of the population. The 1990 and 2000 samples are weighted samples. We use the appropriate
probability weights. Steven Ruggles, Matthew Sobek, Trent Alexander, Catherine A. Fitch, Ronald Goeken, Patricia
Kelly Hall, Miriam King, and Chad Ronnander. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 3.0. Minneapolis,
MN: Minnesota Population Center, 2004, http://www.ipums.org.
12in the U.S. that provides information about heating system choices and energy expenditures at the
state-level for this time period.19
The long form census survey for all years includes questions about household demographics
including household size, family income, and home ownership as well as questions about housing
characteristics including number of rooms, number of units in the building, and decade of construc-
tion. In addition, since 1960 the long form survey has asked households about the primary energy
source they use for heating, and since 1970 households have been asked to report annual expendi-
tures on natural gas, heating oil and electricity. Table 1 reports heating system use in percent. We
divided heating systems into natural gas, heating oil, and electricity. The natural gas category in-
cludes households with heating systems that use gas from underground pipes as well as households
that use bottled, tank, or liqueﬁed gas.20 The heating oil category includes households that use
heating oil, kerosene and other liquid fuels.21 Finally, the electricity category includes households
that use electric heating systems including baseboard heaters and portable electric heating units.
We exclude households that use coal heating because coal was used only at the very beginning of
the sample. In 1960, 12.2% of households used coal or coal coke for heating, but this decreased to
2.9% in 1970 and to 0.4% in 1980. Similarly we exclude households that use wood, solar energy,
briquettes, coal dust, waste materials, purchased steam, other forms of heating, or that report not
using heating. Together these categories represent less than 5% of all households. These households
are treated as inframarginal in that no matter what happens to natural gas prices these households
are assumed not to choose natural gas.
Table 1 also presents average residential prices for electricity, natural gas, and heating oil for
the period 1950-2000. We constructed a state-level database of residential prices for this period by
compiling information from a variety of diﬀerent sources. Prices for 1970-2000 come from E.I.A.
19One possible alternative for household demographics and housing characteristics would be to use the American
Housing Survey (AHS). The AHS is a survey of housing units that elicits information about the primary energy source
used for heating and annual energy expenditures. The AHS includes two types of data collections, a national survey
of housing units and a survey of housing units in a small-number of selected metropolitan areas. The advantage of the
AHS is that it is collected at higher frequency. The AHS was annual between 1973 and 1980 and has been biennial
since 1981. However, because the AHS is available beginning only in 1973 it does not provide data for the beginning
of the period of price regulation. In addition, the sample size in the AHS is much smaller and the state of residence
is not identiﬁed except for households living in the 11 selected metropolitan areas.
20According to E.I.A. (2006a), 71% of residential natural gas consumption in 2004 was used for space heating, 23%
for water heating, 4% for cooking, 1% for clothes dryers and 1% for other uses.
21The Census questionnaire does not distinguish between diﬀerent forms of liquid fuels. However, evidence from
the American Housing Survey (AHS) suggests that distillate heating oil is by far the most common. Since 1977 when
the AHS started making such a distinction, the share of households using distillate heating oil has always exceeded
the share of households using kerosene by a factor of 10 to 1. See E.I.A. (2006d, table 2.7) “Type of Heating in
Occupied Housing Units, Selected Years, 1950-2003”.
13(2006c). Prices for 1950-1969 are constructed following the E.I.A. methodology from industry
sources. For each state and year, residential prices by state are constructed by dividing total
revenue from residential service by total residential sales. State-level annual revenue and sales for
electric utilities from residential customers come from Edison Electric Institute (1945-1969). State-
level annual revenue and sales for natural gas from residential customers come from American
Gas Association (1945-1969). State-level prices for residential heating oil do not exist for the
period 1945-1969 (see EIA 2006c, “State Energy Data 2001: Prices and Expenditures, Section. 4
Petroleum”). Instead, for the earlier period we extrapolate back from 1970 using the annual growth
rate in national average prices as reported for No. 2 heating oil at New York Harbor from McGraw-
Hill (1945-1970). During the period for which state-level heating oil prices are observed there is
little cross-state variation particularly relative to electricity and natural gas which demonstrate
pervasive regional variation. The lack of cross-state variation in the later period suggests that this
extrapolation is unlikely to bias the results. State-level revenue and sales are not available for all
states and all years. For example, in 1960, revenue and sales for natural gas are not available for
Alaska, Maine and Vermont. In these cases regional averages are used instead. Figure 3 shows the
residential prices by region.
5.2 Estimates of the Heating-System Choice Parameters
Table 2 reports estimates of the heating-system choice model. The coeﬃcients for price are
negative and strongly statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that everything else equal households prefer
heating systems with a low price per BTU. The coeﬃcient for the price of electricity is smaller
than the coeﬃcient for natural gas and heating oil prices consistent with the fact that electric
heating systems are considerably more eﬃcient in converting energy into heat.22 The remaining
parameters correspond to household characteristics interacted with indicator variables for natural
gas or heating oil. The default category is electric heating systems. For example, the positive
coeﬃcient for the interaction of heating degree days and natural gas indicates that natural gas
becomes more attractive relative to electricity as the number of heating degree days increases. The
22We constrain the impact of the price of natural gas and heating oil to be the same while allowing the impact of the
price of electricity to diﬀer. The rationale is that natural gas and heating oil furnaces tend to be very similar in terms
of energy eﬃciency whereas electric heating systems require fewer BTUs of energy per unit of heat output. According
to Wenzel et al. (1997), natural gas and oil heating systems have a base annual fuel utilization eﬃciency rate of
77.2% and 80.3%, respectively, compared with electric heating systems. An alternative to our speciﬁcation would
have been to allow the price coeﬃcients to be diﬀerent for all three heating systems. However, there is considerably
less variation in residential heating oil prices than there is in residential prices for natural gas and electricity. This
lack of variation together with the fact that in many states relatively few households choose heating oil would have
made it diﬃcult to identify the price coeﬃcient for heating oil independently.
14corresponding coeﬃcient for heating oil is even larger indicating that all else equal climate is an
even more important determinant for the adoption of heating oil. The other coeﬃcients may be
interpreted similarly. The constants incorporate all additional costs associated with purchasing
and installing a heating system of a particular type, as well as the present discounted value of
the ﬂow of utility generated by the characteristics of a particular heating system. Both natural
gas and heating oil appear less attractive to consumers than electric heating systems, perhaps
reﬂecting larger purchase and installation costs associated with these systems. The particularly
large negative constant for heating oil systems may reﬂect the fact that households tend to dislike
heating oil because it is not as clean-burning as other heating systems and is less convenient.
The heating-system choice model is estimated using the household’s reported primary energy
source for home heating in the U.S. Census. Deregulation of natural gas prices was completed in
1989. In order to isolate choices that were made during the post-regulation period, we restrict
the subset of households used in estimating the parameters of the heating-system choice model
to households living in homes built after 1990. New home buyers during the 1990s did not face
shortages of natural gas when deciding which heating system to purchase. As mentioned earlier,
this is important because by observing these unconstrained choices we are able to identify the
underlying structural parameters that govern household heating system choices.
5.3 Estimates of the Heating Demand Parameters
This subsection describes the speciﬁcation used to estimate the heating demand function given
in equation (3). The sample includes all households that use natural gas as the primary source of
home heating. The dependent variable is annual demand for natural gas in BTUs, constructed by
dividing reported annual expenditures on natural gas by the average residential price of natural
gas for the appropriate state and year. Little previous work has been done to assess the reliability
of these self-reported measures of expenditure. In order to assess this concern, in Section 6.1
we compare natural gas demand derived from the model with residential gas sales reported by
natural gas utilities. Generally, the measure derived from self-reported expenditures is similar to
the measure derived from reporting by utilities suggesting that the magnitude of the bias in the
self-reported measures is small.23
The empirical analogue of our demand equation (3) does not include the price of natural gas.
23In 9.6% of the observations, the Census Bureau imputes expenditures. When these observations are excluded
from the sample used to estimate the heating demand function the parameter estimates are very similar and the
resulting estimates of allocative cost are almost identical.
15Because our measure of demand is constructed using expenditures, any measurement error in price
would cause a spurious correlation between demand and price, leading to estimates of the price
elasticity that are biased away from zero.24 To mitigate this concern we exclude price when esti-
mating the heating demand function and instead rely on regional dummies to capture diﬀerences
in utilization patterns due to persistent regional diﬀerences in energy prices. In addition, we allow
demand to respond to price in the long-run by estimating the heating demand function separately
by decade. For these reasons, we will refer to this model as a “heating demand function” even
though price is not included explicitly. Our speciﬁcation rules out short-run behavioral responses
to annual price variations such as households turning down thermostats, closing oﬀ rooms, and
weatherstripping. There are a number of previous studies that measure this short-run price elas-
ticity of demand for residential heating demand. See Dubin and McFadden (1984), Dubin (1985)
and Dubin, Miedema, and Chandran (1986). These papers have tended to ﬁnd relatively small
price elasticities, particularly Dubin, Miedema, and Chandran (1986) who, based on experimental
evidence, ﬁnd a short-run price elasticity of electrical heating between -0.08 and -0.12. These low
estimates are consistent with our implicit assumption of a zero elasticity.
The heating demand function conditional on the choice of heating system is estimated separately
for households in the 1980, 1990 and 2000 census. The advantage of estimating separate models for
diﬀerent years is that it allows the model to capture changes in heating demand over time that are
not captured by observable characteristics such as global warming. Ideally, we would have liked to
estimate heating demand equations for 1950, 1960 and 1970, as well, but the census responses do not
provide suﬃcient information for these years. In the 1950 census households did not report heating
system type or energy expenditures. In the 1960 census, households reported heating system type
but not energy expenditures. In the 1970 census, all households again reported heating system type,
but only renters were asked to report expenditures on energy. In contrast, in 1980, 1990 and 2000
all households ﬁlling out the long-form survey reported heating system type as well as expenditures
on energy. Given that renters are unlikely to be representative of all households, we deal with the
incomplete data prior to 1980 by using the estimated parameters for 1980 in predicting heating
demand. The resulting estimates are conservative because it seems plausible that heating demand
prior to 1980 would have tended to be higher than heating demand in 1980 because of the increasing
availability of energy eﬃcient materials such as energy eﬃcient windows during the 1970s. As a
24Alternative sources of household-level data like the Residential Consumption Survey provide measures of energy
consumption that avoid this problem, but none provide the geographical or historical coverage available in the U.S.
Census.
16robustness check we also computed estimates from a speciﬁcation in which we predict demand for
1960 and 1970 based on the available sample for 1970. This alternative speciﬁcation implies higher
levels of natural gas demand prior to 1980, leading to somewhat higher estimates of mean annual
allocative cost.
Table 3 presents estimates of the parameters of the heating demand function. Temperature
is one of the most important determinants of energy demand for home heating. Our measure
of temperature is annual heating degree days by state and year from the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration.25 The coeﬃcients for heating degree days are strongly statistically
signiﬁcant. All else equal, a change in heating degree days from the state at the 25th percentile
of heating degree days (Oklahoma) to the state at the 75th percentile (Michigan) is associated in
the 2000 sample with an annual increase of 17.1 million BTUs compared to an average level of
heating of 103.0 million BTUs. The nine census region dummies control for additional variation in
weather that is uncorrelated with heating degree days, as well as regional diﬀerences in building
materials and construction styles. The results reveal that conditional on heating degree days and
other covariates, heating demand tends to be highest in the East North Central region including,
for example, Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio.
The covariates also include household demographics including the number of household mem-
bers, total family income, and home ownership. These demographic characteristics capture sys-
tematic diﬀerences in demand for heating across households. For example, large households tend
to demand more natural gas, perhaps because the home is occupied for more hours during the day
or more rooms are maintained at a higher temperature. Covariates are also included to capture
features of the housing units themselves. These variables include the number of rooms in the home,
the decade of construction, and the number of units in the building.26 Heating demand increases
with the number of rooms and increases with the age of the home. Households in multi-unit struc-
tures tend to use less energy than households in single-family residences, perhaps because of shared
walls and other scale eﬀects. Overall, the estimates of the heating demand function demonstrate
25National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “United States Climate Normals, 1971-2000”, HCS 5-1 and
HCS 5-2, 2002. The state averages are population-weighted within states in order to reﬂect conditions existing in the
more populous sections of each state. If we were modeling total residential energy demand instead of heating demand
then it would also be important to include cooling degree days. Air conditioning systems are rarely operated with
natural gas.
26The purpose of the heating demand function is to provide a reasonable description of the distribution of heating
demand across households, not to provide a perfect prediction of heating demand for particular households. The model
does not purport to capture all of the components of heating demand captured by engineering models of residential
energy demand like the E.I.A. (2006a). Indeed, modeling the shell eﬃciency, insulation, and heat transmission
properties of diﬀerent housing structures remains a large and active area of research. The model we present in this
section proxies these factors in a parsimonious manner.
17that heating demand varies substantially across homes with diﬀerent weather, demographic and
housing characteristics.
Finally, ﬁve out of the six selection terms are statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level
suggesting that the unobserved determinants of heating demand and heating system choices are
indeed correlated. The sign for the electricity selection term is positive for all decades, and the
sign for the heating oil selection term is negative for all decades. This pattern is consistent with
an ordering of heating systems in which households who prefer warm homes tend to prefer heating
oil to natural gas and natural gas to electricity. For example, the positive coeﬃcients on the
electric selection term reﬂect that households who choose natural gas heating systems because of
unobservables are also likely to use high levels of natural gas. Similarly, the negative coeﬃcients
on the heating oil selection term reﬂect that households who choose natural gas instead of heating
oil because of unobservables tend to use low levels of natural gas.
5.4 Simulating Demand for Natural Gas
The heating-system choice model and heating demand function, together with energy prices
and household characteristics are used to simulate heating system choices and heating demand for
the U.S. year by year for the period 1950-2000. In the following section we compare the choices
implied by the model with households’ actual choices to calculate physical shortages of natural gas
and to measure the allocative cost of price ceilings.
In order to simulate demand for natural gas, one must determine for each year the set of
households purchasing a new heating system. The census long-form questionnaire does not elicit
the year in which households buy a new heating system, but it does include a question about the age
of the residence. We assume that all households buy a new heating system in the year the residence
is constructed. For example, households in the 1980 census living in a 5-year old home are assumed
to have purchased a new heating system in 1975. In practice, the census provides a range of ages
of homes (such as 6-10 years), rather than the exact age, so in the model households are assigned
at random to one of the years within the range. In addition, we assume that households in existing
homes must occasionally replace broken equipment. E.I.A. (2006b) assumes that heating systems
have an average lifetime of 17.5 years. Accordingly, we assume that households living in homes
over 10 years old have a 5.71% annual probability of buying a new heating system.27 Our model
27The annual replacement probability of (1/17.5) = 0.05714 implies an average heating system lifetime of 17.5
years.
18abstracts from the possibility that households may retroﬁt their home with a new heating system
before the existing system breaks down.28
Among the households in the market for a new heating system, household characteristics, energy
prices, and the estimated parameters of the heating-system choice model are used to determine each
household’s probability of choosing a natural gas heating system. The expected level of demand
for natural gas for a particular household is the probability that the household chooses a natural
gas heating system multiplied by demand for heating measured in BTUs. Demand is aggregated
by state and year for the period 1950-2000.29
6 Results
6.1 Physical Shortages
This section contrasts our model’s predictions of residential demand for natural gas during the
period 1950-2000 with the actual consumption. Although our ultimate objective is to measure the
allocative cost of price regulation during this period, the measures of shortage that are discussed in
this section provide a ﬁrst check on the ability of the model to replicate the well-known qualitative
pattern of physical shortages during this period. Moreover, these results are of independent interest
in that we provide the most comprehensive assessment to date of the magnitude, timing, and
geographic distribution of physical shortages.
Figure 4 describes residential demand for natural gas in the U.S. by year for 1950-2000. The
dashed line is actual residential consumption of natural gas in the U.S. as reported by natural
gas utilities in E.I.A. (2006c). The dotted line is actual residential consumption of natural gas
as inferred from the Census microdata. For 1961-2000, this measure of actual consumption is
28Rust (1987, p. 903) points out that a potential weakness of the Dubin and McFadden (1984) framework is
that the timing of replacement is assumed to be exogenous: “What is required is a formal dynamic programming
model of the appliance investment decision, which models consumer expectations of future prices by speciﬁcation of
a parametric stochastic process governing their law of motion.” While we defer this point for future research, it is
reassuring that empirical evidence suggests that a substantial fraction of replacements of heating systems are the
result of mechanical failures rather than pre-planned upgrades. Among households in the 1993 Residential Energy
Consumption Survey that had recently purchased a new main heating system, 57% indicated that their old system
was working “not well” or “not working at all” at the time of replacement.
29Balestra and Nerlove (1966) and Balestra (1967) were the ﬁrst studies in the energy demand literature to make
a distinction between new demand and total demand. In their model energy demand is a function of lagged energy
demand and relative prices. In the section below, new demand refers to demand for natural gas derived from
households that adopt natural gas during a particular year, either because they are purchasing a new home or
because they are replacing the heating technology in an existing home. Because of large adjustment costs, households
change heating fuels infrequently, so much of the responsiveness of demand over a short period of time is derived from
new demand. Total demand is the sum of new demand in the current year and new demand accumulated during the
previous 16.5 years, reﬂecting our assumption about the lifetime of natural gas heating systems.
19constructed using reported heating system choices and reported levels of heating expenditures. For
1950-1960, consumption levels from utilities are used instead because the Census questionnaire did
not elicit heating expenditures during this period. An important criterion of ﬁt is the model’s
ability to replicate the actual consumption levels. Figure 4 shows that both measures of actual
consumption of natural gas increase steadily between 1960 and 1970 and then level oﬀ during the
later period. Although the ﬁt is not perfect, it is reasonably close.30
The solid line in ﬁgure 4 is the level of natural gas demand predicted by our model at observed
natural gas prices. Since our heating-system choice model is estimated using choices observed
after natural gas deregulation, the model is able to describe the important counterfactual of what
demand would have been at observed prices, had all households had access to natural gas. Our
empirical strategy reveals how much natural gas would have been consumed during 1950-2000 based
on preferences revealed in the post-regulation period, and controlling for household demographics
and housing characteristics that aﬀect heating demand.
Simulated demand follows actual consumption reasonably closely during the 1950s and 1960s,
although even at the beginning of the sample period there is evidence of a small but growing
physical shortage of natural gas. Our ﬁnding of a shortage as early as the 1950s and early 1960s
runs counter to the conventional wisdom that shortages did not emerge until 1970. Our result
is consistent, however, with anecdotal evidence that indicates that restrictions on new residential
installations of natural gas were common in many parts of the U.S. during the 1950s and 1960s.31
Figure 4 indicates large diﬀerences between simulated demand and actual consumption during
the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, with the gap narrowing at the end of the 1990s.32 The pattern of
30It is not clear why the utility-based measure of consumption increased more than the microdata-based measure
during the 1990s. According to the census microdata, between 1990 and 2000 the total number of households with
natural gas heating increased by 22.0% but the mean level of heating consumption per household decreased by 17.3%.
This evidence is diﬃcult to reconcile with the 12.9% increase in residential gas consumption during the same period
reported by utility companies.
31Two quotes from the related literature illustrate this point. The American Gas Association (1951, p. 158) stressed
that “as is well known, gas costs have been considerably less than other heating fuels in many parts of the country and
this fact, in addition to the advantages of convenience and cleanliness have necessitated the imposition of restrictions
on new installations in some areas because of the temporary inability to meet the peak demand which would be
created”. Likewise, MacAvoy (1983, p. 81) notes that “during the 1960s the FPC maintained wellhead prices at
approximately the level that was being realized in open markets just before regulation got under way. [...] Gas
demand increases, partly as a result of lower prices for gas relative to other fuels, exceeded the GNP and total energy
consumption growth rates each year. Commensurate supply increases were forthcoming only at marginal costs higher
than average historical costs. In unregulated markets prices would have risen to the level of those higher marginal
costs. But because controlled price ceilings were based on average costs less than marginal costs, the regulated prices
could not bring about the necessary increases in supply”.
32In these ﬁgures and throughout the rest of the paper we use the measure of actual consumption that is derived
from the Census Microdata. Although in principle one could use either of the two measures of actual consumption,
in practice it is considerably more diﬃcult to use the utility-based measure because new demand must be inferred
from total demand. In contrast, the microdata is already disaggregated and can be used to construct new demand
20a substantial increase in natural gas shortages beginning in the early 1970s is consistent with
evidence of shortfalls in contractually-obligated deliveries to pipelines. According to Vietor (1984),
these curtailments began in the early 1970s and reached 15% of the entire market for natural gas
in 1976.33 This timing is consistent with the pattern of physical shortages implied by the model.
Figure 5 describes residential demand by region for the same period. The pattern for the North-
east, Midwest, and South is similar to the national pattern, with large diﬀerences between simulated
and actual demand throughout the period. The shortages in the Northeast are particularly severe.
The pattern for the West is considerably diﬀerent from the pattern for the other regions, with
virtually no diﬀerence between simulated demand and actual consumption. The pattern for in-
dividual states reveals that shortages were widespread across states and regions, with the largest
shortages observed in New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. These results are available in a
not for publication appendix.
We ﬁnd that during 1950-2000 total U.S. demand for natural gas exceeded observed sales of
natural gas by an average of 20.3%, with the largest shortages during the 1970s and 1980s. Our
estimates of the physical shortage provide a more complete description of the degree of disequi-
librium in the natural gas market than previously-used measures such as the curtailment of gas
deliveries. In particular, our measure correctly incorporates not only demand from existing delivery
contracts, but the unrealized demand from prospective new customers as well. The need for such
a comprehensive measure of shortages has long been recognized in the literature. For example,
MacAvoy (1983, p. 85) notes:
“Regulatory rules against connecting new gas customers were put into eﬀect in most
northern metropolitan regions in the early 1970s. The excess demand of those excluded
from gas markets was not listed as a ‘shortage,’ and yet substantial numbers of potential
new residential and commercial customers denied service by state and federal regulations
were ‘short’ by the entire amount of their potential demands.”
We conﬁrm MacAvoy’s intuition that curtailments understate the degree of disequilibrium in
the market because they fail to incorporate demand from potential new customers who are pre-
vented from adopting gas heating by their local utilities in an eﬀort to preserve service to existing
customers.
Our results also diﬀer signiﬁcantly from previous interpretations of how the period of shortages
using the age of residence as described in Section 5.4.
33MacAvoy (1983, p.85) reports even larger curtailments: “Forced curtailments of committed deliveries increased
from 12% of total interstate demand in 1973 to 30% in 1975. Further curtailments caused the short deliveries to
exceed 40% of the total in 1978.”
21ended. The conventional wisdom is that shortages were alleviated in 1979. Many observers have
pointed to the apparent “gas glut” in the early 1980s as evidence of the end of the era of price
regulation. In sharp contrast, we ﬁnd shortages throughout the 1980s and well after the complete
deregulation of wellhead prices in 1989. These highly persistent shortages only become apparent
owing to our use of a microeconometric model, illustrating the importance of explicit modeling of
household decisions.
The intuition for these shortages is as follows: At any point in time, demand is derived from
households that purchased their home heating systems many years ago. Thus, even many years after
complete deregulation, a substantial fraction of households continued to be locked into suboptimal
heating system choices, prolonging the eﬀects of regulatory policies long beyond the oﬃcial end of
regulation. For example, under our assumptions, 70% of households in 2000 are living in homes
with heating systems that were purchased prior to complete deregulation in 1989. The observed
shortage in 2000 reﬂects the fact that many of these households would have preferred to purchase
natural gas heating systems, had natural gas been available at the time of purchase.
6.2 The Within-State Allocation of Gas During Shortages
Allocative costs arise from the misallocation of natural gas across states and across households
within states. In the previous section we examined the pattern of the allocation of gas across states.
Consistent with the previous literature, we found that gas was widely available in gas-producing
states and most Western states, whereas there were severe shortages in the Northeast and Midwest.
An equally important question is how natural gas was allocated to households within states during
shortages. As is well documented, for both political and technical reasons, gas distributors chose
not to curtail service to existing residential customers.34 When there was a shortage, service was
suspended to non-residential customers. See, e.g., Vietor (1984, p. 275-277) and Braeutigam (1981,
p. 156-158). In addition, shortages were dealt with by denying potential new residential customers
access to natural gas.35
Who among potential new residential customers was granted access and who was not directly
aﬀects the size of the allocative costs to be computed in section 6.3. In particular, to the extent that
the within-state allocation of gas favored households with high reservation prices, the magnitude
34As Vietor 1984 points out, “human need, consumer protection, and safety were real concerns. The problem of
relighting pilot ﬂames on 50 million [residential] gas burners easily identiﬁed the top priority user.”
35As described in American Gas Association (1975, p. 67) the gas shortage caused widespread restrictions on new
residential customers and severely limited expansion into new residential customer markets by many utilities. See
also MacAvoy and Pindyck (1975, p. 2), Herbert (1992, p. 127) and American Gas Association (1976, p. 125).
22of the allocative costs will be reduced. The key question addressed in this section is where the
within-state allocation under regulation fell on the scale from optimal to random and why. Of
particular concern is the role, if any, played by non-market allocation mechanisms such as queuing,
bribes, or secondary markets. In this subsection we provide tentative evidence that the allocation of
natural gas within states was essentially random among households interested in acquiring natural
gas service, and we make the case that non-market allocative mechanisms did not play a major role
during regulation.
In section 6.2.1 we study how access to natural gas varied within state with observables. We
construct a crude test of the empirical importance of non-market allocative mechanisms. The results
of this test suggest that non-market allocative mechanisms such as queuing, bribes, or secondary
markets did not play a major role under regulation. It is important to understand why these
mechanisms failed to improve the eﬃciency of the within-state allocation of natural gas. In section
6.2.2 we discuss the institutional features of the natural gas market that blunted the eﬀectiveness
of these non-market allocative mechanisms. We contrast the natural gas market with the market
for the Toyota Prius, a prominent recent example of a market in which non-market allocative
mechanisms were important.
6.2.1 How Does the Within-State Allocation Vary with Observables?
Table 4 reports mean household characteristics for U.S. households with and without natural
gas heating from the 1980 census. We focus on households living in homes built between 1975 and
1978, the period of peak shortages. Statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences are highlighted in boldface.36
The table reveals several substantive diﬀerences between the two groups. For example, households
who report having natural gas heating have higher family incomes than households who report using
electricity or heating oil for home heating. In addition, households with natural gas are more likely
to be homeowners, tend to live in larger homes, and tend to live in single-family residences rather
than multi-unit buildings. The patterns in table 4 are consistent with the parameter estimates
reported in table 2 and reﬂect diﬀerences across households in preferences for natural gas heating
systems. For example, the positive coeﬃcient on the interaction between homeownership and
natural gas in table 2 reﬂects the fact that, everything else equal, homeowners prefer gas heating
systems more than non-homeowners.
36The construction of critical values for this test is complicated by the fact that our sample sizes are large. As is
well known, for suﬃciently large sample sizes, any null hypothesis is bound to be rejected at conventional signiﬁcance
levels. We follow Leamer (1978, p. 108-120) in constructing a critical value that is appropriate for this sample size.
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households. What we would like to know is not how household characteristics diﬀered between
residential customers and non-customers, but rather whether potential new residential customers
who were granted access to natural gas were systematically diﬀerent along observable dimensions
from those who were not. Only the latter comparison may be used to shed light on the extent
to which non-market allocative mechanisms resulted in preferential access to natural gas for some
households under regulation. The inherent diﬃculty is that, when we observe a household that does
not use natural gas heating, the Census data do not reveal whether this household was rationed
out of the market or was oﬀered access to gas and chose not to receive gas.
A crude idea of how households with access to natural gas diﬀered from households without
access to gas may be obtained by examining a subset of households whom we would expect to want
gas given their observable characteristics. The advantage of this strategy is that the control group
will be mostly composed of households who were denied natural gas service rather than households
who had the opportunity to purchase gas, but chose not to for idiosyncratic reasons. We focus
on a set of households that according to our heating system choice model would have been likely
to have chosen natural gas (see table 2). In particular, we focus on homeowners living in large
single-family homes. To improve the power of the test, we restrict the sample to homeowners in
New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts, the three states with the largest physical shortages
during 1975 to 1978.
Table 5 shows average characteristics of homeowners with and without natural gas living in
homes built between 1975 and 1978. For all three states, the average characteristics for homeowners
with natural gas are similar to the average characteristics for homeowners without gas. If non-
market allocative mechanisms were resulting in preferential access to natural gas for some types of
households, one would expect these observable characteristics to be substantially diﬀerent across
these two groups. This does not appear to be the case.
Tests of the equality of the sample means across the two groups indicate that in only one out
of thirty cases the null hypothesis of equal means is rejected, which is well within the range of
rejections one would expect in repeated applications of a statistical test (see, e.g. Inoue and Kilian,
2004). Moreover, the covariates do not follow any clear pattern. For example, in Massachusetts, the
fraction of households for which the household head is non-white is higher among households with
gas than households without gas, whereas in New York the pattern goes the other way. Finally,
the diﬀerences are small in magnitude. For example, in all three states, family income is higher
24among the group of households with gas, but the diﬀerence averages only $1,605 compared with a
mean income level of $73,703. We have examined average characteristics for other states including
those in the Midwest and South-Atlantic regions and the results are similar. Among the ten states
with the largest physical shortages during this period, the average diﬀerence in income was $1,542
compared to a mean income level of $74,852. This suggests that along the scale ranging from
optimal to random, the within-state allocation was fairly close to random.
6.2.2 Institutional Features of the Natural Gas Market that Limit the Scope for
Non-market Allocative Mechanisms
Section 6.2.1 demonstrated that there is no evidence of non-random rationing on observables
among households interested in acquiring natural gas service, consistent with the view that non-
market allocative mechanisms did not play a major role under regulation. As it turns out, there
were several key institutional features of the natural gas market which explain why leading examples
of such mechanisms such as queueing, bribes, and secondary markets, familiar from other markets,
did little to improve the eﬃciency of the within-state allocation of natural gas.
It is important to understand the diﬀerences between the market for natural gas and the market
for other goods subject to shortages. A prominent recent example is the Toyota Prius, a vehicle
that was subject to severe shortages during 2004-2006 when there was a large increase in demand
for hybrid vehicles at the list price set by Toyota. Even without a market clearing price, however,
several features of the market for this vehicle made it possible for high willingness-to-pay buyers to
receive the good.
First, an active secondary market emerged. There were many accounts of “lightly used” Prius
vehicles being sold on Ebay or other outlets for used cars. As discussed in section 3, the existence
of a secondary market mitigates the allocative costs of regulation. In contrast, no secondary market
ever existed for natural gas. Unlike in the Toyota Prius example, it was impossible to purchase
a natural gas connection from someone else either within state or across state lines. Nor is it
likely that the eﬃciency of the within-state allocation gas would have been improved by households
moving within state. Moving costs tend to be large, and a natural gas connection is only one of
many home characteristics (such as school quality, property tax levels, commuting distance to work,
resale value, age of home, size of home, neighborhood amenities, etc) considered by households.
Whereas vehicle markets are national in scope and one can purchase a vehicle with virtually any
bundle of characteristics, the housing market is considerably more local and tends to be thin,
25making it diﬃcult to ﬁnd a home that matches a household’s preferences along all dimensions.
Thus, there was little scope for household mobility to mitigate the misallocation of natural gas
within state. Moreover, given that our heating system choice model predicts that preferences for
natural gas are increasing in income, one would expect any such sorting in the housing market to
result in systematic diﬀerences in income levels in table 5; yet there is no quantitatively important
diﬀerence in income between households with and without natural gas.
Second, Toyota responded to the Prius shortage by creating a waitlist. In fact, Toyota Prius
buyers could join waitlists at multiple Toyota dealerships and then travel to the appropriate dealer
when a vehicle became available. In sharp contrast, there is no record of waitlists for residential
natural gas service, despite abundant evidence on the use of non-market allocative mechanisms
in the non-residential gas market.37 This lack of direct evidence is not surprising. Even if a
waitlist had existed, households would have been unlikely to use it. To the extent that occasionally
additional natural gas became available for the residential sector, gas was allocated to homes that
happened to be under construction at the time. Since households had to select a heating system
as they moved in, there was little scope for queuing to improve the eﬃciency of allocation. For
example, any delay in house construction involves a considerable opportunity cost measured in
foregone interest. Similarly, if a household with an oil heating system happened to experience a
breakdown in January in the state of Michigan (which is when breakdowns tend to occur, given
that heating systems are not used during summer) the owner would be understandably reluctant
to wait in line for months or years for natural gas heating. Finally, queuing is costly and one would
expect a household’s propensity to queue to be positively correlated with variables such as family
income, yet there is no compelling evidence in table 5 of diﬀerences in income being quantitatively
important.
Third, Toyota allowed the price mechanism to be restored selectively. Even though Toyota
refused to increase the price of cars sold to dealers, there were steps taken by dealers to increase
dealer markups, moving ﬁnal prices closer to equilibrium prices. For example, dealers frequently
packaged vehicles with expensive after-market options such as undercoating, stereo upgrades, and
roof racks. In contrast, there was no scope for such price increases in the residential natural gas
market. Local gas distributors were highly regulated during this period and it was illegal for them
to price discriminate. Thus, a key diﬀerence between these markets is that Toyota Prius dealers
stood to gain from allocating a Prius to buyers with high willingness-to-pay. Sallee (2008) reports
37For example, Braeutigam (1981, p. 156) describes in detail the rationing rules for industrial customers.
26that dealers’ mean incentive adjusted markup for the Toyota Prius between 2004 and 2006 averaged
$2,300 dollars. In contrast, natural gas distribution companies had no incentive to provide gas to
customers with a high willingness to pay since the price was regulated.
This does not rule out other pecuniary incentives. For example, one could imagine households
bribing utility oﬃcials to obtain preferential access to natural gas. This seems unlikely. Not only
is there no documented case of such bribery, but given their small expenditure share on energy,
households had little to gain from bribing oﬃcials, but potentially much to lose if caught. Moreover,
one would expect the ability to bribe to be highly correlated with household characteristics such
as income, yet, as mentioned before, there were no systematic diﬀerences in average family income
in table 5.
In light of these institutional features of the national gas market, it is not surprising that there
is no evidence in table 5 of rationing on observables. Based on the empirical and institutional
evidence presented in this section, it appears that non-market allocative mechanisms did little to
improve the eﬃciency of the within-state allocation of gas among households interested in acquiring
natural gas service relative to a purely random allocation. We will exploit this feature of the data
in section 6.3.
6.3 Allocative Costs
Physical shortages are important for describing the eﬀect of price regulations, but in themselves
do not provide a measure of economic costs. Whereas physical shortages and allocative cost are
closely related, they are not linearly related. The nonlinearity arises as follows. In our model,
households must choose between alternative heating technologies. Households respond diﬀerently
to changes in market conditions depending on their proximity to the margin between natural gas
and alternative forms of energy. As a result, the elasticity of substitution varies across households.
Market demand for natural gas reﬂects the composition of households represented at each point
along the demand curve. Thus, changes in the relative price of gas will not be linearly related to
shifts in the demand for natural gas. Our household-level approach to modeling demand provides an
alternative to the common assumption of linearity in aggregate analyses of the natural gas market.
Although the assumption of a linear demand curve may not be unduly restrictive in many contexts
such as simulating the eﬀect of small changes in prices, it is a strong assumption for welfare analysis
because the estimates depend on the shape of the entire demand function. The ﬂexible treatment
of substitution patterns is one of the advantages of using a household-level model.
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not allocating a good to the buyers that value it the most, measured as the diﬀerence between the
consumer surplus under the actual allocation and the consumer surplus under the allocation when
buyers are rationed eﬃciently. Under eﬃcient rationing, the good is provided to the buyers with
the highest reservation prices and welfare cannot be improved upon by reallocating the good among
buyers. In an unregulated market this allocation is achieved with a national market clearing price.
In a regulated market, the actual allocation typically does not provide the good to the buyers that
value it the most. The allocative cost refers to the welfare gains that can be realized from replacing
the actual allocation by the allocation under eﬃcient rationing. The consumption of natural gas is
the same each year under eﬃcient rationing as it is under the actual allocation.
By construction, the size of the allocative cost depends on the degree of physical shortage by
state and year, the distribution of reservation prices across households, and the distribution of
natural gas among households prior to redistribution. The technical appendix provides a detailed,
step-by-step description of the calculation of the allocative costs. As described in the appendix,
in calculating the allocative costs we assume that during shortages, the within-state allocation of
natural gas is random among households with a reservation price higher than the observed price.
This approximation, which is supported by the evidence in section 6.2, allows us to overcome the
diﬃculty that the microdata do not distinguish between households who chose not to use natural
gas and households who were rationed out of the market.
Figure 6 plots the allocative cost by year for the entire U.S. during 1950-2000. During the
period 1950-2000, the mean annual allocative cost in the U.S. was $4.6 billion with a peak of $6.4
billion in 1980. This represents, on average, 16.4% of total residential expenditure on natural gas
over the 1950-2000 period. It can be shown that most of these costs were borne by households
in the Northeast, Midwest and South, with households in the West bearing a smaller amount.
Total allocative cost in the Midwest and South decreased substantially during the 1980s and 1990s,
though in neither case did costs disappear by 2000. In the Northeast costs were more persistent,
with large costs remaining in 2000. This ﬁnding is not surprising. For example, with new heating
system purchases limited to new construction and heating system replacements in existing homes,
between deregulation in 1989 and 2000 only 30% of households would have purchased new heating
systems. The adjustment was particularly slow in the Northeast because there was less new housing
construction compared to the South or West.
Our estimates of the allocative costs are of the same order of magnitude as previous estimates in
28the literature for the conventional deadweight loss. MacAvoy (2000), for example, reports a mean
annual deadweight loss of $10.5 billion between 1968 and 1977. We ﬁnd that during this same
period, the mean annual allocative cost in the residential market was $5.9 billion. Because this
allocative cost is in addition to the conventional deadweight loss, our estimates suggest that total
welfare losses from natural gas price regulation were considerably larger than previously believed.38
There are two obvious concerns about the reliability of our estimation procedure. The ﬁrst
concern is that the random assignment of households in computing the allocative cost introduces
simulation error. A second concern is parameter estimation error. Sampling variation in the
parameter estimates of our heating-system choice model and heating demand function induces
variability of the welfare losses measured at the second-stage. Table 6 reports bootstrap standard
errors for the estimated allocative cost based on randomly drawn sets of households of the same
size as the original dataset. Bootstrap replicates of the allocative cost measure are constructed by
reestimating all model parameters for each bootstrap sample and simulating the implied allocative
cost.39 As one would expect given the large sample size, the standard errors are generally negligible.
For example, we ﬁnd a standard error of only 0.036 billion around the mean annual allocative cost
of $4.56 billion.
We also assessed the robustness of our results to alternative model speciﬁcations. Table 6 also
reports estimates of mean allocative cost for three alternative speciﬁcations of the utility function.
All three speciﬁcations include covariates in addition to the set of covariates used in the benchmark
speciﬁcation. These additional covariates are included both in the heating-system choice model and
in the heating demand function. The ﬁrst alternative includes the age of the head of the household
as well as indicator variables (again corresponding to the household head) for nonwhite, high school
graduate, and college graduate. The second alternative speciﬁcation includes indicator variables
for each number of rooms, instead of treating the eﬀect of number of rooms linearly. The third
alternative speciﬁcation includes a cubic in family income. Mean annual allocative cost in all three
speciﬁcations is similar in magnitude to the estimate in the benchmark speciﬁcation, suggesting
that the benchmark speciﬁcation does a reasonable job at controlling for observable determinants
of heating demand and conﬁrming that the results are not unduly sensitive to minor variations in
functional form.
38These large allocative eﬀects are consistent with theoretical evidence about the relative size of allocative cost and
conventional deadweight loss. Glaeser and Luttmer (2003) show that allocative cost exceeds conventional deadweight
loss when the demand curve is linear and price ceilings reduce quantity supplied by less than 50%.
39We use 100 bootstrap replications. This number is conventional in the statistical literature (see Efron and
Tibshirani, 1994). Moreover, a larger number of replications would be computationally prohibitive.
29As discussed earlier, we are interested in the thought experiment of redistributing natural gas
across households to ensure the highest level of welfare. This reallocation involves redistributing the
amount of natural gas actually consumed in each year both across state lines and across households
within states. One component of allocative cost is associated with the gain in consumer surplus
from reallocating gas within state to consumers with the highest reservation price, holding constant
the actual allocation across states. The eﬃcient within-state allocation is reached when there are
no additional reallocations within state that can increase consumer surplus. A second component
of the allocative cost is associated with the gain in welfare from reallocating natural gas across
states, assuming eﬃcient rationing within states. All else equal, total consumer surplus increases
when natural gas is reallocated toward states where the marginal household has a high reservation
price. Rationing is eﬃcient across states and households when the marginal household in each state
has the same reservation price.
Thus, the total allocative cost can be decomposed into a within-state component and an across-
state component. We ﬁnd that, during the period 1950-2000, the mean annual within-state alloca-
tive cost was $3.70 billion and the mean annual across-state allocative cost was $0.86 billion. This
decomposition reveals that the bulk of the allocative cost comes from the misallocation of natural
gas within states. Although we do ﬁnd that eﬃcient rationing requires large movements of natural
gas across state borders, these shifts are not associated with large changes in the consumer surplus.
The reason is apparent from equation (6) in the technical appendix. If reservation prices are high
in areas with high actual prices, the change in the consumer surplus may be small, notwithstanding
large shifts in quantities across state borders.
6.4 The Geographical Distribution of Allocative Cost
As described in Section 2, the political process leading to the regulation of the natural gas
industry pitted gas consuming states in the Midwest and Northeast against gas producing states in
the Southwest. Given these geographical divisions, an important question from a political economy
point of view is how the allocative costs were distributed across regions and states.
Table 7 reports the results by state. One of the strengths of our microeconometric approach
is that we are able to provide insights into the distributional eﬀects of regulation that could not
have been obtained using a model based on national or even regional data. We ﬁnd that the
most-aﬀected states are in the Mid-Atlantic region (New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey), New
England (Massachusetts, Connecticut), the Midwest (Indiana, Illinois) and the South Atlantic
30region (Virginia, North Carolina, Maryland). These results substantiate beliefs widely held in
previous studies. There are also a few mild surprises. It is generally accepted that the Northeast
and the Midwest suﬀered the most from price regulation (see, for example, Tussing and Barlow
1984 or Viscusi, Harrington, and Vernon 2005). The South Atlantic states, however, have not
typically been included in this discussion. Although these states are not subject to the extended
cold temperatures common in more northern states, households in the South Atlantic states do use
large amounts of energy for home heating, and our simulation evidence suggests that they were
consistently unable to satisfy their demand for natural gas.40
Another somewhat surprising ﬁnding is the overall level of cost borne by states in the Northeast.
As mentioned in the introduction, there have been few studies that have looked at the eﬀect of
the natural gas price ceilings by region. An important exception is MacAvoy and Pindyck (1975)
who use a structural dynamic simultaneous equation model to simulate shortages by region. They
conclude that, had prices continued at 1974 levels throughout the 1970s, residential and industrial
shortages in 1978 (in trillions of cubic feet) would have been 4.3 in the Midwest, 1.7 in the Southeast,
0.7 in the Northeast and 0.2 in the West. Thus for 1978 they expected to ﬁnd 62% of the shortage
in the Midwest. We ﬁnd that although the Midwest residential market was indeed aﬀected, the
Northeast was aﬀected more severely, both in terms of physical shortages and allocative cost.41
As states diﬀer in size and population, it is of additional interest to express these costs on a per
capita basis. The lower panel of table 7 reports the states with the largest annual allocative cost per
person. It is striking that many of the states are from sparsely-populated, northern states. In 1954,
there were 419,670 miles of natural gas pipeline in the U.S. with 63,980 miles in the northeast and
126,640 miles in the Midwest.42 The network included every state in the continental U.S. except for
Maine, Vermont, Idaho, Washington and Oregon. During the mid 1950s the network was expanded
to include customers in the Northwest, but some parts of New England and the Dakotas were slow
40This ﬁnding that households living in the South Atlantic states bore large allocative costs is consistent with
anecdotal evidence from the period. Sanders (1981, p.139) reports that, “A minority of households in the region used
natural gas, although Southerners in the fuel-deﬁcit states would clearly have preferred gas to the far more expensive
electricity and alternative fuels upon which the region’s households depended.”
41The geographical distribution is very similar when misallocation is measured using physical units rather than
allocative cost. Under eﬃcient rationing there would have been higher natural gas consumption in the Northeast
and South Atlantic states in particular and lower natural gas consumption elsewhere. We ﬁnd that on average
Northeastern states (such as New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey) and South Atlantic States (such as Virginia
and Maryland) received between 27% and 48% less natural gas than they would have under eﬃcient rationing. In
contrast, gas-producing states such as Texas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Louisiana received between 27% and 45%
more natural gas.
42American Gas Association (1955), table 46.
31to be connected to the pipeline network.43 This provides an explanation for the disproportionate
representation of northern states with low population densities among the top ten states with the
highest per-capita allocative cost. If households were not able to purchase natural gas because it
was not available, this would appear in our model as evidence of allocative cost.44
Figure 7 shows the geographic distribution of the average annual allocative cost per capita. The
plot emphasizes the regional pattern of the distribution of costs. Households living in gas-producing
states and households in most Western states tended to face low allocative costs. In contrast,
households living in the Midwest, Northeast and South Atlantic states faced comparatively high
costs. The per capita costs were highest in the Northeast and Midwest.
It is interesting to contrast this pattern with the distribution of the political support for regu-
lation. As noted by Sanders (1981) and Vietor (1984) it is widely believed that support for natural
gas regulation was most entrenched in the gas consuming states east of the Mississippi, while gas
producers in the Southwest staunchly advocated deregulation. This belief is at least partially con-
ﬁrmed by voting records from 1973. Figure 8 indicates the extent of Congressional support for
regulation as evidenced by the Senate voting pattern for a 1973 motion to table the 1973 Buckley
Amendment (S2776).45 This amendment, which would have deregulated prices for new sales of
natural gas, was defeated 45-43. There is a distinct regional pattern in the voting record. Senators
from gas-producing states in the Southwest (Louisiana, Texas, and Oklahoma) clearly supported
deregulation, whereas senators from Midwestern, Northeastern, and South Atlantic states generally
supported regulation. It is evident from comparing ﬁgures 7 and 8 that price regulation was sup-
ported even in states where households faced large allocative costs. This ﬁnding is consistent with
the view that politicians in 1973 focused on the beneﬁts of price regulation for existing customers
and discounted the costs to customers without access to natural gas. Regulation was supposed to
protect consumers in Northern markets from high gas prices, and it may have been that senators
in those states continued to act on this belief even in 1973, even as the adverse consequences of
regulation were becoming increasingly apparent. Our analysis suggests that Senators were slow to
catch on because much of the shortage did not manifest itself in overt curtailments of service to
residential customers, but involved restricting access to new residential customers.
43American Gas Association (1955), p.78.
44If we exclude Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont and North Dakota our results are virtually unchanged. Mean
annual allocative cost decreases by only 4.6%.
45The correlation between states with high allocative costs per capita (deﬁned as costs in excess of $10 annually
per capita) and states with strong senatorial support for regulation (deﬁned as both senators voting in support of
regulation) is 0.46 and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Disregarding western states that had little vested
interest in this debate the correlation is even higher.
326.5 Out-of-Sample Fit of the Model
Our empirical results in sections 6.3 and 6.4 hinge on the idea that, conditional on observables,
households’ unconstrained choices in the 1990s can be used to predict the choices that households
would have made during earlier decades in the absence of regulation. There are several approaches
to verifying the realism of this thought experiment. In this subsection we show that our estimation
procedure yields only minimal estimates of allocative cost when applied to settings where the
market operates freely. The fact that the model performs well in these out-of-sample contexts adds
credibility to the results presented in the previous subsections.
One approach is to evaluate the out-of-sample ﬁt of the model for Texas, Louisiana, New
Mexico and Oklahoma, the four states accounting for the bulk of U.S. natural gas production
during the period of regulation. As discussed previously, a key characteristic of the price regulation
implemented during this period is that it applied only to interstate sales of natural gas. Because the
FPC did not have jurisdiction over intrastate sales, prices for gas sold in gas-producing states were
unregulated. Thus, there is no reason to expect a shortage in Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma and
Texas under regulation. As a result, simulated demand for these states, based on households’ choices
in the 1990s for the entire United States, should closely follow actual consumption. Furthermore,
the allocative costs in these states should be negligible.
Figure 9 plots the demand for gas implied by our model and actual consumption in Louisiana,
New Mexico, Oklahoma and Texas. The model does well at describing the basic pattern of actual
consumption in these states, particularly in contrast to the often dramatic shortages observed in
non-gas producing states. Moreover, allocative cost in these gas-producing states is eﬀectively zero,
averaging only $3.64 million (or $0.56 per capita) annually during the period 1950-1989, compared
with $1470 million (or $81.70 per capita) in New York, one of the leading examples of states aﬀected
by the regulation of natural gas.
An alternative approach to evaluating the out-of-sample ﬁt of the model involves estimating the
allocative cost for households that installed heating systems since deregulation of natural gas prices
was completed in 1989. Since these households did not face price ceilings, their allocative cost should
be negligible. This proposition can be tested by splitting the 2000 Census data into two random
samples. One of the subsamples is used to estimate household preferences conditional on covariates;
the model is then used to predict allocative cost for the households in the other subsample. We ﬁnd
that the mean annual allocative cost among households who made heating system choices during
33the period of regulation was $98.69 per household. In contrast, the mean annual allocative cost
among households living in homes purchased in 2000 was $16.28 per household. This is a small
amount compared to the allocative cost estimated for the earlier period. Suppose, nevertheless,
we interpret that estimate as a measure of the potential model mispeciﬁcation, a revised estimate
of mean annual allocative cost can be constructed by subtracting this baseline from the estimate
of $4.56 billion reported in table 6, resulting in a mean annual allocative cost of $3.49 billion.
This alternative estimate, while smaller than the baseline estimate, is still of the same order of
magnitude.
6.6 Sensitivity Analysis with Alternative Counterfactuals
Our empirical strategy relies on household behavior during the 1990s to infer household prefer-
ences during the entire postwar period. Although the model constructed under this counterfactual
ﬁts the data well, it is important to assess the robustness of our results to alternative identify-
ing assumptions. In this section we estimate the model using an alternative counterfactual that
exploits the fact that not all states were subject to natural gas price regulation. As discussed
previously, price regulation applied only to interstate sales of natural gas. As a result, states that
were net exporters of natural gas were not subject to price ceilings and provide another benchmark
for estimating the model of household preferences. For this purpose we compile a dataset of all
net exporters of natural gas by decade. We re-estimate household preferences using data for these
states from the entire post-war period. This alternative empirical strategy provides an important
test of the robustness of our results, but it is not without its limitations. One disadvantage is that
we reduce the number of households used in estimating preferences from 708,320 under the baseline
counterfactual to 326,431. A second, and more important limitation is that gas-producing states
tend to be geographically concentrated and as a result, are relatively homogenous. For example,
there is limited variation across gas-producing states in control variables such as heating degree
days, making it diﬃcult to identify and to control for the eﬀects of this variable on household
demand in gas-consuming states such as New York or Michigan with much colder temperatures.
Nevertheless, the estimates obtained under this alternative counterfactual are not unreasonable.
We estimate a mean annual allocative cost of $9.62 billion (or 34% of consumption), about twice
the baseline estimate. Despite the higher level of allocative cost, the geographic distribution and
pattern over time of shortages and allocative cost are very similar to the baseline counterfactual.
Given the additional caveats associated with this counterfactual, we prefer to focus on the more
34conservative baseline estimate.
An attractive feature of this alternative counterfactual is that it allows us to test whether
the parameters of the heating-system choice model are changing over time. This is an important
concern because preferences may have changed since the 1950’s, making it diﬃcult to extrapolate
back from households’ choices in the 1990s. Another reason for possible time variation in the
model parameters are secular changes in heating system characteristics. Both phenomena may
be captured by allowing the parameters of the heating-system choice model to evolve over time.
When estimating a speciﬁcation of the model that allows all model parameters for demographic
characteristics, housing characteristics, heating degree days, and fuel prices to vary by decade,
we indeed ﬁnd evidence of statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in parameters across decades. The
implied mean annual allocative cost of $8.31 billion, however, is not very diﬀerent from the model
with time-invariant parameters. Likewise, the geographic distribution and pattern over time of
shortages and allocative cost are very similar.
Table 8 provides additional detail on which coeﬃcients are changing in the time-varying prefer-
ence exercise and how they are linked to estimates of physical shortages and allocative costs. For
each decade, the table reports how the parameter estimates change relative to the result for all
exporters when parameters are not allowed to vary across decades. Each row highlights the change
in physical shortages and allocative costs associated with allowing only the parameter in this row
to change while holding all other parameters constant. Table 8 shows that the baseline results for
the gas exporters are remarkably robust to allowing for time variation in housing characteristics
and demographic characteristics. The results are somewhat more sensitive to allowing the eﬀect
of heating degree days to vary over time. This is not surprising because gas-producing states tend
to be concentrated in the Southwest. There is little variation in heating degree days across gas
producers, making the parameters in question poorly identiﬁed. Likewise, the parameters on price
per BTU, which are by far the most sensitive parameters, are particularly poorly identiﬁed when
allowing for time-varying preferences. The lack of variation in the data is associated with unusually
high standard errors for these parameters in the regressions underlying table 8. Overall, table 8
provides no evidence of economically interpretable changes in preferences. Moreover, it is reassuring
that the net eﬀect of allowing for all changes combined (shown in the last row) is small compared
to the magnitude of the baseline estimate for net exporters.
The sensitivity analysis in this section underscores that among the alternative counterfactuals
considered in this paper the original baseline model based on household behavior during the 1990s
35is likely to be the most reliably identiﬁed and hence the most credible. While the alternative
estimates of allocative cost are about twice as large as the original baseline estimate, there is reason
to interpret these estimates with some caution, leading us to interpret the estimate of section 6.3
as a conservative lower bound.
7 Conclusion
Whereas the importance of allocative costs is well recognized as a theoretical matter, its quanti-
tative importance in real-life markets has remained uncertain, owing to the diﬃculties of empirically
quantifying such costs. Our study is the ﬁrst to demonstrate how allocative costs in a market sub-
ject to price ceilings may be estimated. We focused on the U.S. residential market for natural
gas. Our analysis showed that the allocative cost in this market averaged $4.6 billion annually
during the period of 1950-2000. We found that the allocative cost was borne disproportionately
by households in the Northeast and in selected states in the Midwest and South Atlantic region.
While our estimates of allocative cost are large, total allocative cost for all consumers is likely to
be even larger than the magnitudes reported here, given that our analysis has been restricted to
the residential market.
Our analysis illustrates the importance of careful ex ante economic analysis. Price ceilings for
natural gas were supposed to help consumers, particularly consumers in northern markets, who
in the 1950s were concerned about rising natural gas prices. We found that these very consumers
ended up bearing a disproportionately large share of the allocative cost. This is exempliﬁed by the
case of the state of Wisconsin. As described in Section 2, the post-war era of price regulation in
natural gas markets in the U.S. began with the Supreme Court’s ruling on Phillips vs. Wisconsin.
This case was brought to court in an eﬀort protect Wisconsin consumers from increasing natural
gas prices. The actual eﬀects of regulation on Wisconsin consumers was far less clear cut. While
consumers with access to natural gas indeed beneﬁted from lower prices, when there is a shortage,
not all consumers will have access to the market, and those who have access will not necessarily
be the consumers who value the good the most. Our estimates show that households in Wisconsin
suﬀered an average annual allocative cost of $125 million between 1950 and 2000, in addition to
the conventional deadweight loss. Households in many other northern states who were supposed
to be protected by the Supreme Court decision fared even worse.
From a national perspective, the costs to consumers of regulating the price of natural gas out-
36weighed the beneﬁts to consumers. MacAvoy (2000) estimates that at the national level between
1968 and 1977 natural gas price ceilings transferred an average of $6.9 billion annually from produc-
ers to consumers while causing consumers a deadweight loss of $9.3 billion. Thus, even abstracting
from allocative cost, price ceilings made consumers worse oﬀ by $2.4 billion. Adding the allocative
cost eﬀectively triples the estimated net welfare loss to U.S. consumers. Alternative modeling as-
sumptions tend to raise the estimate of the allocative costs, suggesting that our baseline estimate
is, if anything, conservative.
Our analysis is not only relevant for understanding the consequences of regulation in the U.S.
residential natural gas market, but it has implications for other markets as well. Allocative costs
due to price ceilings arise more generally whenever the good in question cannot be readily traded in
secondary markets, as would be the case, for example, in insurance, health care, or telecommunica-
tions markets. The broader conclusion of our paper is that policymakers in conducting an ex ante
economic analysis of regulatory reform ought to take careful account of the allocative cost of price
regulation in addition to the conventional deadweight loss. In particular, our analysis showed that
the eﬀects of price ceilings may be very uneven across households and states, that it is diﬃcult to
determine in advance how the cost will be distributed geographically, and that the adverse eﬀects
of price ceilings tend to last much longer than the regulatory policies themselves.
378 Appendix: Calculating the Allocative Cost
The calculation of the allocative cost discussed in Section 6.3 involves the following steps: In
step 1, we compute the reservation price for each household i. The reservation price, P∗
i , is deﬁned
implicitly by equation (4) as the natural gas price that makes household i indiﬀerent between
natural gas and the next best heating alternative (i.e., electricity or heating oil):
Uig(P∗
i ) = max(Uie,Uio). (4)
We refer to these alternatives as g for natural gas, e for electricity, and o for heating oil. Substituting
the form of the utility function from equation (1), subsuming e−βjpij into the error term as discussed
in Section 4, eliminating ηi because it is identical across alternatives, and solving for P∗
i yields the
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ie = α0e +
α1e
βe
+ α1epse + γewi + βeyi + ǫie
and
U∗
io = α0o +
α1o
βo
+ α1opso + γowi + βoyi + ǫio.
Thus, the reservation price is a function of observable characteristics wi and yi, unobservable
characteristics ǫig, ǫie, and ǫio, prices pse and pso, and model parameters such as βg and α1g.
We treat the unobservable characteristics for each household i and heating system j as a random
component, ǫij, with an extreme value distribution. In other words, we draw a diﬀerent ǫij for
each household depending on the alternative j.46 This component captures unobserved diﬀerences
across households’ preferences for particular heating systems. As discussed in Section 4, ǫij is
assumed to be i.i.d. across households and heating systems conditional on the observed covariates.
We compute P∗
i from equation (5) using these ǫij terms, the observable characteristics wi and yi
for each household from the Census microdata, the prices from our price data, and the parameter
estimates reported in table 2. This procedure is also used for predicting reservation prices in section
6.2.2 when examining the within-state allocation of natural gas.
In step 2, we calculate the consumer surplus for each household.47 Let pst denote the actual
price for natural gas in state s and year t. A household’s annual consumer surplus is the diﬀerence
between its reservation price and pst, multiplied by the household’s annual demand for gas, ˆ xig.
Annual demand for gas is the predicted value from equation (3) using the parameter estimates in
table 3:
CSi = (P∗
i − pst) ˆ xig. (6)
In step 3, we compute total consumer surplus for all households in the market under eﬃcient
46This procedure introduces simulation error because for each household the calculated reservation price represents
one possible realization. However, because the number of households in our sample is very large, the procedure
introduces little variation in national and state measures of the allocative cost. Moreover, the bootstrap standard
errors reported in the paper take this simulation error into account.
47Our measure of consumer surplus coincides with both compensating variation and equivalent variation in response







CSi ∗ 1(erit) ∗  i (7)
where 1(erit) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if household i receives natural gas in year t under
eﬃcient rationing and  i refers to the Census population weights. Under eﬃcient rationing, natural
gas is allocated to the households with the highest reservation price ﬁrst, until all available gas has
been allocated.48 We repeat this procedure for each year, assuming that households that received
natural gas in the past will be able to continue to receive natural gas, so that the allocation
problem is limited to reallocating gas among potential new customers. Consumer surplus for sets
of states and for speciﬁc years are calculated by summing the consumer surplus over the appropriate
subsample.
In step 4, we calculate θst, the fraction of households that had access to natural gas among all
households in state s and year t that would have wanted to choose natural gas heating,
θst =
P
i∈s,t ˆ xig ∗ 1(actualit) ∗  i
P
i∈s,t ˆ xig ∗ 1(P∗
i > pst) ∗  i
(8)
where 1(actualit) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if household i receives natural gas in year t
and the indicator variable 1(P∗
i > pst) is equal to one for households with a reservation price that
exceeds the actual price for natural gas in state s and year t. Thus, 1−θst is a percent measure of
the shortage of natural gas for a given state and year.49 The numerator in equation (8) represents
the actual consumption of natural gas in state s among households choosing a heating system in
year t, as observed in the Census microdata. The denominator is simulated demand, i.e., what
demand would have been at observed actual prices had all households had access to natural gas
as predicted by the model. In a small number of cases, θst is smaller than zero or larger than 1.
These cases are treated as zero and 1, respectively.
In step 5, we compute the total consumer surplus under the assumption that the within-state
allocation of natural gas was random among households interested in acquiring natural gas service.
Section 6.2 provides evidence that, within states subject to regulation, households interested in
acquiring natural gas had similar observable characteristics whether they received natural gas or
not, consistent with the actual within state allocation of gas being well approximated by a random
allocation. It is important to emphasize that this random allocation assumption is invoked only for
determining the allocation of natural gas within states among those households that are interested in
acquiring natural gas service during a given year. The consumer surplus is calculated by allocating
natural gas at random to a fraction, θst of the potential new natural gas customers in each state
and year. Consumer surplus is then calculated by summing over all households with a reservation
price in excess of the observed price. The consumer surplus obtained under the actual allocation
48When ordering households under eﬃcient rationing we use reservation prices rather than consumer surplus. To
maximize social welfare it is necessary to provide gas to households with the highest willingness-to-pay per unit, not
the highest total consumer surplus.
49It is important to clarify that θst is calculated as a function of new demand rather than total demand. New
demand refers to demand for natural gas derived from households that adopt natural gas during a particular year,
either because they are purchasing a new home or because they are replacing the heating technology in an existing
home. As we have done throughout, households that have received natural gas in the past are assumed to be able
to continue to receive natural gas, so that the allocation problem is limited to reallocating gas among potential new
customers. Thus, the t subscript in θst refers to a cohort of households making a heating system in year t. Total
demand for natural gas is calculated by summing new demand over time.






CSi ∗ Bθst ∗  i (9a)
where B is a Bernoulli random variable with success probability θst with success indicating access







i − pst) ˆ xig ∗ Bθst ∗  i. (9b)
In step 6, we compute the allocative cost as
AC = CSer − CSrr. (10)
40References
[1] American Gas Association. Gas Facts. A Statistical Record of the Gas Utility Industry. Lexington, NY:
American Gas Association Bureau of Statistics, 1945-1969.
[2] Balestra, Pietro and Marc Nerlove. “Pooling Cross-Section and Time Series Data in the Estimation of a
Dynamic Model.” Econometrica, 1966, 34(3): 585-612.
[3] Balestra, Pietro. The Demand for Natural Gas in the U.S. – A Dynamic Approach for the Residential
and Commercial Market, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1967.
[4] Bernard, Jean Thomas, Denis Bolduc and Donald Belanger. “Quebec Residential Electricity Demand:
A Microeconomic Approach.” Canadian Journal of Economics, 1996, 29(1): 92-113.
[5] Bourguignon, Francois, Martin Fournier and Marc Gurgand. “Selection Bias Corrections Based on the
Multinomial Logit Model: Monte-Carlo Comparisons”, working paper, 2004.
[6] Bradley, Robert L., Jr. “Forward” in Ellig, Jerry and Joseph P. Kalt, eds., New Horizons in Natural Gas
Regulation Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996.
[7] Braeutigam, Ronald R. “The Deregulation of Natural Gas.” in Weiss, Leonard W. and Michael W. Klass,
eds., Case Studies in Regulation: Revolution and Reform. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1981.
[8] Braeutigam, Ronald R. and R. Glenn Hubbard. “Natural Gas: The Regulatory Transition.” in Weiss,
Leonard W. and Michael W. Klass, eds., Regulatory Reform: What Actually Happened. Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1986.
[9] Breyer, Stephen and Paul W. MacAvoy. “The Natural Gas Shortage and the Regulation of Natural Gas
Producers.” Harvard Law Review, 1973, 86(6): 941-987.
[10] Card, David and Alan B. Krueger. “Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast-Food
Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania.” The American Economic Review, 1994, 84(4): 772-793.
[11] Cookenboo Jr., Leslie. “Competition in the Field Market for Natural Gas.” The Rice Institute Pamphlet,
1958, 44(4): 1-125.
[12] Dubin, Jeﬀrey A. and Daniel L. McFadden. “An Econometric Analysis of Residential Electric Durable
Good Holdings and Consumption.” Econometrica, 1984, 52(2), 345-362.
[13] Dubin, J., Consumer Durable Choice and Demand for Electricity, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1985.
[14] Dubin, Jeﬀrey A., Allen K. Miedema, and Ram V. Chandran. “Price Eﬀects of Energy-Eﬃcient Tech-
nologies: A Study of Residential Demand for Heating and Cooling.” RAND Journal of Economics, 1986,
17(3), 310-325.
[15] Edison Electric Institute. Statistical Year Book of the Electric Utility Industry. New York, New York:
Edison Electric Institute, 1945-1969.
[16] Efron, Bradley and R.J. Tibshirani. An Introduction to the Bootstrap, Boca Raton: Chapman and Hall,
1994.
[17] Energy Information Administration (E.I.A.). “Annual Energy Outlook 2006”, March 2006 (2006a),
DOE/EIA-0445.
[18] Energy Information Administration (E.I.A.). “Assumptions to the Annual Energy Outlook 2006”, March
2006 (2006b), DOE/EIA-0445.
[19] Energy Information Administration (E.I.A.). “State Energy Consumption, Price, and Expenditure Es-
timates (SEDS)”, October 2006 (2006c).
[20] Energy Information Administration (E.I.A.). “Annual Energy Review 2005”, July 2006 (2006d),
DOE/EIA-0384.
[21] Feng, Ye, Don Fullerton, and Li Gan. “Vehicle Choices, Miles Driven and Pollution Policies.”, NBER
Working Paper 11553, Cambridge, MA, 2005.
41[22] Frech III, H.E. and William C. Lee. “The Welfare Cost of Rationing-By-Queuing across Markets: Theory
and Estimates from the U.S. Gasoline Crises.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1987, 102(1): 97-108.
[23] Friedman, Milton and George Stigler. “Roofs or Ceilings? The Current Housing Problem.” Popular
Essays on Current Problems, 1946, 1(2).
[24] Glaeser, Edward L. and Erzo F.P. Luttmer. “The Misallocation of Housing Under Rent Control.”
American Economic Review, 2003, 93(4), 1027-1046.
[25] Goldberg, Pinelopi K. “The Eﬀects of the Corporate Average Fuel Eﬃciency Standards in the US.”
Journal of Industrial Economics, 1998, 46(1), 1-33.
[26] Hausman, Jerry A. “Individual Discount Rates and the Purchase and Utilization of Energy-Using
Durables.” Bell Journal of Economics, 1979, 10(1), 33-54.
[27] Hayek, Friedrich A. von. “Wirkungen der Mietzinsbeschr¨ ankungen.” Schriften des Vereins f¨ ur Socialpoli-
tik, 1931, 182: 253-270.
[28] Herbert, John H. “Clean Cheap Heat: The Development of Residential Markets for Natural Gas in the
United States.” New York: Praeger Publishers, 1992.
[29] Holzer, Harry J., Lawrence F. Katz and Alan B. Krueger. “Job Queues and Wages.” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 1991, 106(3): 739-768.
[30] Inoue, Atsushi and Lutz Kilian. “In-Sample or Out-of-Sample Tests of Predictability: Which One Should
We Use?”, Econometric Reviews, 23(4), November 2004, 371-402.
[31] Kalt, J. P. “Market Power and the Possibilities of Competition” in Kalt, J.P. and F.C. Schuller, eds.,
Drawing the Line on Natural Gas Regulation. New York: Quorom Books, 1987, 89-124.
[32] Leamer, Edward E. Speciﬁcation searches: Ad hoc inference with nonexperimental data, New York:
Wiley-Interscience, 1978.
[33] Lindahl, Martin L. “Federal Regulation of Natural Gas Producers and Gatherers.” American Economic
Review: Papers and Proceedings., 1956, 46(2): 532-544.
[34] Luttmer, Erzo F.P. “Does the Minimum Wage Cause Ineﬃcient Rationing?” The B.E. Journal of
Economic Analysis and Policy, 2007, 7(1), (Contributions), Article 49.
[35] MacAvoy, Paul W. “The Regulation-Induced Shortage of Natural Gas.” Journal of Law and Economics,
1971, 14(1): 167-199.
[36] MacAvoy, Paul W. Energy Policy: An Economic Analysis, New York: W. W. Norton and Company,
1983.
[37] MacAvoy, Paul W. The Natural Gas Market, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000.
[38] MacAvoy, Paul W. and Robert S. Pindyck. “Alternative Regulatory Policies for Dealing with the Natural
Gas Shortage.” Bell Journal of Economics, 1973, 4(2), 454-498.
[39] MacAvoy, Paul W. and Robert S. Pindyck. The Economics of the Natural Gas Shortage (1960-1980),
Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1975.
[40] Mannering, F. and Winston, C. “A Dynamic Empirical Analysis of Household Vehicle Ownership and
Utilization” RAND Journal of Economics, 1985, 16(2): 215-236.
[41] Mansur, Erin T., Robert Mendelsohn, and Wendy Morrison. “Adapting to Climate Change: A Study
of Fuel Choice and Consumption in the U.S. Energy Sector.” forthcoming in Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, 2008, 55(2).
[42] McGraw-Hill. Platt’s Oil Price Handbook and Oilmanac. New York, New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing
Company, Incorporated, 1945-1970.
[43] Nesbakken, Runa. “Energy Consumption for Space Heating: A Discrete-Continuous Approach.” Scan-
dinavian Journal of Economics, 2001, 103(1): 165-184.
42[44] National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. “Monthly State, Regional, and National Heating
Degree Days, Weighted by Population”, 2001, Historical Climatology Series 5-1.
[45] Neuner, E.J. The Natural Gas Industry. Monopoly and Competition in Field Markets, University of
Oklahoma Press: Norman, 1960.
[46] Olsen, Edgar O. “An Econometric Analysis of Rent Control.” Journal of Political Economy, 1972, 80(6):
1081-1100.
[47] Raymon, Neil. “Price Ceilings in Competitive Markets with Variable Quality.” Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 1983, 22: 257-264.
[48] Rust, John. “Book Review: Consumer Durable Choice and the Demand for Electricity by Jeﬀrey A.
Dubin (1985)” Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 94(4): 900-904.
[49] Sallee, James M. “The Incidence of Tax Incentives for Hybrid Vehicles.” working paper, 2008.
[50] Sanders, M. Elizabeth. The Regulation of Natural Gas: Policy and Politics, 1938-1978, Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1981.
[51] Smith, Rodney T. and Charles E. Phelps. “The Subtle Impact of Price Controls on Domestic Oil
Production.” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 1978, 68(2): 428-433.
[52] Tussing, Arlon R. and Connie C. Barlow. The Natural Gas Industry: Evolution, Structure, and Eco-
nomics, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1984.
[53] Vietor, Richard H. K. Energy Policy in America Since 1945, Cambridge, Massachusetts: University
Press, 1984.
[54] Viscusi, W. Kip, Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., and John M. Vernon. Economics of Regulation and Antitrust,
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005.
[55] Weitzman, Martin L. “Is the Price System or Rationing More Eﬀective in Getting a Commodity to
Those Who Need it the Most?” The Bell Journal of Economics, 1977, 8(2): 517-524.
[56] Welch, Finis. “Minimum Wage Legislation in the United States.” Economic Inquiry, 1974, 12(3): 285-
318.
[57] Wenzel, Tom P., Jonathan G. Koomey, Gregory J. Rosenquist, Marla Sanchez, and James W. Hanford.
“Energy Data Sourcebook for the U.S. Residential Sector.” September 1997, Energy Analysis Program,
Environmental Energy Technologies Division, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, University of California,
Berkeley, CA.
[58] West, Sarah. “Distributional Eﬀects of Alternative Vehicle Pollution Control Policies.” Journal of Public
Economics, 2004, 88, 735-757.












Q** Q* Q  















Q** Q* Q  

















































































































Sources: (1970−2000) Energy Information Administration, (1950−1969) Edison Electric Institute
Electricity

































1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Simulated Demand
Actual Consumption (census microdata)
Actual Consumption (reported by utilities)








































1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Simulated Demand









































1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Simulated Demand









































1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Simulated Demand









































1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Simulated Demand
Actual Consumption (census microdata)
West
































1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year













































1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Simulated Demand




































1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Simulated Demand




































1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Simulated Demand




































1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Simulated Demand




1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Number of Households (millions) .414
a .547 3.42 3.76 4.42
Primary Energy Source Used for Home Heating (percent)
Natural Gas 57.3 64.3 62.8 62.4 63.2
Heating Oil 40.8 28.7 20.7 15.6 11.6
Electricity 1.8 7.0 16.5 22.0 25.2
Fuel Price per million BTUs
Natural Gas 6.6 5.1 7.9 7.6 7.9
Heating Oil 7.0 5.7 14.5 9.4 9.7
Electricity 44.8 30.8 35.0 32.3 25.9
Household Demographics
Household Size (persons) 3.3 3.1 2.7 2.6 2.6
Family Income (1000s) 34.1 43.6 40.7 48.3 54.2
Home Ownership Dummy (percent) 61.9 63.4 64.5 67.3 68.5
Housing Characteristics
Number of Rooms 5.0 5.2 5.4 5.5 5.6
Multi-Unit (percent) 24.3 28.0 29.3 23.4 22.8
Home Built in 1940’s (percent) 14.2 12.5 11.2 8.9 7.7
Home Built in 1950’s (percent) 26.2 21.7 17.5 15.3 13.2
Home Built in 1960’s (percent) 0.0 25.2 19.7 16.2 13.6
Home Built in 1970’s (percent) 0.0 0.0 24.4 20.7 17.8
Home Built in 1980’s (percent) 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.2 14.2
Home Built in 1990’s (percent) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.0
aOf the households who ﬁlled out the long-form questionnaire in 1960, a 20%
random sample answered one set of additional questions which included the heat-
ing fuel question, and the other 80% answered an alternative set of questions
which included the question about the number of units in the building.
Note: As described in detail in the text, the household and housing characteris-
tics are from the U.S. Census, 1% samples for 1960 and 1970 and 5% samples for
1980, 1990, and 2000. For 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000, energy prices come from
E.I.A. (2006c). For 1960, state-level energy prices are from Edison Electric Insti-
tute (1961), American Gas Association (1961) and McGraw-Hill (1965). Dollar
amounts are expressed in year 2000 dollars.
49Table 2
Estimates, Heating-System Choice Model
Price per BTU (Gas and Oil) -0.392 (0.002)
Price per BTU (Electricity) -0.117 (0.001)
Gas Oil
Heating Degree Days (HDD)
HDD (1000s) 0.291 (0.009) 1.42 (0.022)
HDD Squared (10,000,000s) 0.034 (0.010) -0.494 (0.018)
Demographic Characteristics
Two Household Members -0.032 (0.009) 0.050 (0.021)
Three Household Members -0.164 (0.010) 0.083 (0.023)
Four Household Members -0.152 (0.010) 0.137 (0.023)
Five Household Members -0.162 (0.013) 0.140 (0.028)
Six or More Members -0.162 (0.016) 0.111 (0.036)
Total Family Income (10,000s) 0.032 (0.001) 0.022 (0.001)
Homeowner Dummy 0.293 (0.010) 0.112 (0.023)
Housing Characteristics
Rooms 0.146 (0.002) 0.046 (0.004)
Building Has 2 Units -0.114 (0.023) -0.790 (0.052)
Building Has 3-4 Units -0.546 (0.018) -1.67 (0.056)
Building Has 5-9 Units -0.755 (0.017) -2.46 (0.067)
Building Has 10-19 Units -0.876 (0.018) -2.67 (0.076)
Building Has 20-49 Units -0.979 (0.020) -2.07 (0.061)
Building Has 50+ Units -1.14 (0.018) -2.05 (0.055)
Constant -2.20 (0.030) -8.43 (0.071)
Note: The model was estimated using maximum likelihood with 708,320 ob-
servations.
50Table 3
Estimates, Heating Demand Function
1980 1990 2000
Heating Degree Days (HDD)
HDD (1000s) 26.7 (.279) 18.3 (.222) 12.5 (.198)
HDD Squared (1,000,000s) -1.93 (.027) -1.04 (.022) -0.67 (.021)
Regional Dummies
New England Region 12.0 (.446) 5.70 (.365) 17.6 (.333)
Middle Atlantic Region 18.9 (.357) 11.8 (.281) 27.7 (.279)
East North Central Region 51.2 (.355) 29.3 (.273) 25.9 (.240)
West North Central Region 46.9 (.392) 12.2 (.296) 3.45 (.252)
South Atlantic Region 37.5 (.255) 10.6 (.246) 15.2 (.217)
East South Central Region 58.7 (.311) 20.9 (.290) 17.1 (.255)
West South Central Region 54.0 (.258) 21.0 (.230) 12.8 (.205)
Mountain Region 22.4 (.379) 3.08 (.294) 11.2 (.252)
Demographic Characteristics
Two Household Members 9.46 (.183) 4.96 (.145) 3.72 (.130)
Three Household Members 21.7 (.217) 12.4 (.178) 9.23 (.163)
Four Household Members 25.5 (.231) 14.8 (.189) 11.2 (.171)
Five Household Members 35.1 (.290) 21.6 (.256) 16.5 (.234)
Six or More Members 52.8 (.358) 33.2 (.342) 23.2 (.313)
Total Family Income(10,000s) 0.05 (.026) 1.42 (.018) 1.04 (.013)
Homeowner Dummy 2.81 (.203) .293 (.174) 1.98 (.169)
Housing Characteristics
Rooms 8.74 (.054) 7.91 (.044) 4.84 (.040)
Home Built in 1940’s -12.7 (.229) -8.63 (.222) -6.24 (.224)
Home Built in 1950’s -20.1 (.192) -13.0 (.184) -10.1 (.182)
Home Built in 1960’s -21.2 (.195) -14.5 (.185) -11.2 (.184)
Home Built in 1970’s -27.0 (.238) -17.8 (.185) -13.1 (.180)
Home Built in 1980’s - - -25.7 (.187) -16.2 (.188)
Home Built in 1990’s - - - - -20.3 (.209)
Building Has 2 Units 5.94 (.312) 3.40 (.328) 2.06 (.319)
Building Has 3-4 Units -12.6 (.377) -10.1 (.375) -8.50 (.338)
Building Has 5-9 Units -26.4 (.418) -26.4 (.370) -20.3 (.335)
Building Has 10-19 Units -29.6 (.440) -30.5 (.372) -23.4 (.364)
Building Has 20-49 Units -38.1 (.541) -40.5 (.445) -32.9 (.406)
Building Has 50+ Units -26.9 (.656) -39.2 (.621) -25.5 (.481)
Selection Terms
Electricity Selection Term 28.0 (.816) 10.7 (.617) 8.30 (.630)
Heating Oil Selection Term -26.6 (1.07) -9.43 (.839) -0.64 (.733)
Constant 3.22 (.811) 5.02 (.639) 22.0 (.683)
n 1,893,915 2,128,210 2,552,137
R
2 0.23 0.24 0.17
Note: The heating demand function is estimated separately by decade. The
dependent variable is annual natural gas consumption in millions of BTU.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. The excluded region
is the Paciﬁc region and the excluded home vintage is homes built before the 1940s.
Observations are weighted using probability weights.
51Table 4
The Allocation of Gas in the United States 1975-1978
Households Households
With Gas Without Gas
Two Household Members 0.29 0.29
Three Household Members 0.19 0.19
Four Household Members 0.21 0.20
Five Household Members 0.10 0.09
Six or More Members 0.05 0.04
Total Family Income (10,000s) 4.99 4.52
Homeowner Dummy 0.74 0.68
Age of Household Head 40.5 40.0
Household Head High School Graduate 0.81 0.80
Household Head College Graduate 0.26 0.25
Household Head Non-White 0.09 0.08
Total Number of Rooms 5.69 5.47
Single Family Residence 0.65 0.61
Number of Households 143,245 171,644
Note: This table reports mean characteristics for households from the 1980 cen-
sus living in homes built between 1975 and 1978, the period of peak shortages.
Households with gas are those who report using natural gas as their primary form
of home heating. Households without gas are those who report using electricity
of heating oil as their primary form of home heating. Statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerences using Leamer (1978) critical values are highlighted in boldface. Dollar
amounts are in year 2000 dollars.
52Table 5
The Allocation of Gas Within States 1975-1978, Homeowners Living in Large Single-Family Homes
New York Pennsylvania Massachusetts
Homeowners Homeowners Homeowners Homeowners Homeowners Homeowners
With Gas Without Gas With Gas Without Gas With Gas Without Gas
Two Household Members 0.14 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.11
Three Household Members 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.18
Four Household Members 0.35 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.31 0.37
Five Household Members 0.18 0.23 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.20
Six or More Members 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.16 0.12
Total Family Income (10,000s) 7.26 7.17 7.29 7.01 7.94 7.82
Age of Household Head 39.2 38.0 38.8 38.5 41.5 38.3
Household Head High School Graduate 0.93 0.93 0.96 0.94 0.96 0.95
Household Head College Graduate 0.47 0.45 0.52 0.47 0.59 0.59
Household Head Non-White 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.03
Number of Homeowners 445 1235 394 1875 186 494
Note: This table reports average characteristics for homeowners with and without natural gas (i.e., who report using heating oil or electricity).
The sample includes homeowners living in large (more than 7 total rooms), single-family homes. Statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences using
Leamer (1978) critical values are highlighted in boldface. Dollar amounts are in year 2000 dollars.
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3Table 6
Average Annual Allocative Cost 1950-2000, in Billions
Benchmark Estimate $4.56 (0.036)
Alternative Speciﬁcations of Utility
Additional Household Demographics $4.27 (0.037)
Flexible Speciﬁcation for Number of Rooms $4.62 (0.033)
Flexible Speciﬁcation for Family Income $4.50 (0.030)
Note: These estimates are based on the baseline counterfactual in
which household preferences are estimated based on households’ un-
constrained choices during the 1990s. Bootstrap standard errors based
on 100 replications are shown in parentheses. Dollar amounts are ex-
pressed in year 2000 dollars.
54Table 7
Results by State, 1950-2000
Average Annual Allocative Cost, in Millions of Dollars
1. New York 1398 (14.0)
2. Pennsylvania 778 (8.76)
3. New Jersey 369 (5.41)
4. Massachusetts 332 (5.80)
5. Virginia 292 (7.75)
6. North Carolina 228 (3.80)
7. Maryland 207 (4.73)
8. Connecticut 194 (2.92)
9. Indiana 192 (5.25)
10. Illinois 127 (8.34)
Average Annual Allocative Cost per Person, in Dollars
1. Delaware 76.3 (1.68)
2. New York 73.7 (0.74)
3. Maine 71.3 (1.35)
4. New Hampshire 68.3 (1.06)
5. Pennsylvania 63.4 (0.72)
6. Vermont 61.1 (1.17)
7. North Dakota 59.0 (3.10)
8. Rhode Island 58.6 (1.44)
9. Alaska 58.0 (1.82)
10. Connecticut 56.9 (0.86)
Note: These estimates are based on the baseline coun-
terfactual in which household preferences are estimated
based on households’ unconstrained choices during the
1990s. Bootstrap standard errors based on 100 replica-
tions are shown in parentheses. Dollar amounts are ex-
pressed in year 2000 dollars.
55Table 8
How Allowing for Shifts in the Demand Parameters Aﬀects Physical Shortages and Allocative Cost
Change in Parameter Estimates Change in Change in
Relative To Net Exporter Benchmark Average Annual Average Annual
Parameters 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s Physical Shortage Allocative Cost
Price per BTU (Gas and Oil) 0.13 -0.02 -0.02 -0.18 -0.75 5.68
Price per BTU (Electricity) 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 3.19 1.34
Heating Degree Days (HDD) for Gas
HDD (1000s) -0.65 -0.53 0.13 0.38
HDD Squared (10,000,000s) 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
-10.28 -3.80
Demographic Characteristics for Gas
Two Household Members -0.03 0.04 0.04 -0.07 0.02 0.00
Three Household Members 0.16 0.11 0.11 -0.15 0.21 0.13
Four Household Members 0.31 0.13 0.06 -0.12 0.26 0.23
Five Household Members 0.23 0.12 0.12 -0.18 0.13 0.08
Six or More Members 0.34 0.08 0.14 -0.27 0.14 0.06
Total Family Income (10,000s) -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 -1.68 -0.64
Homeowner Dummy 0.58 0.13 -0.10 0.12 0.90 0.87
Housing Characteristics for Gas
Rooms -0.13 -0.08 -0.03 0.08 -5.49 -1.90
Building Has 2 Units 0.38 0.20 -0.16 -0.15 -0.22 0.14
Building Has 3-4 Units 0.33 0.17 -0.35 0.17 -0.27 0.09
Building Has 5-9 Units 0.73 0.18 -0.55 0.30 -0.33 0.13
Building Has 10-19 Units 0.26 0.14 -0.65 0.33 -0.32 0.16
Building Has 20-49 Units 0.06 0.21 -0.61 0.17 -0.33 0.08
Building Has 50+ Units 0.05 0.11 -0.92 0.19 -0.35 0.03
Constant 1.95 1.42 -0.93 -0.59 3.13 3.43
Heating Degree Days (HDD) for Oil
HDD (1000s) 0.67 0.27 -0.03 -0.37
HDD Squared (10,000,000s) -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.71 3.31
Demographic Characteristics for Oil
Two Household Members -0.06 -0.04 0.21 -0.36 -0.23 0.04
Three Household Members 0.23 0.08 0.03 -0.46 -0.25 0.04
Four Household Members 0.09 0.07 -0.01 -0.43 -0.24 0.06
Five Household Members -0.26 0.05 0.21 -0.70 -0.23 0.06
Six or More Members -0.24 -0.04 0.24 -0.60 -0.22 -0.02
Total Family Income (10,000s) -0.01 0.0 0.00 0.01 -0.23 0.04
Homeowner Dummy 1.03 0.35 -0.21 0.06 -0.67 0.02
Housing Characteristics for Oil
Rooms -0.12 -0.06 0.01 0.13 -0.11 -0.26
Building Has 2 Units 0.17 0.38 -0.08 -0.19 -0.24 0.20
Building Has 3-4 Units 0.82 0.43 -0.42 -0.01 -0.29 0.06
Building Has 5-9 Units 0.96 0.49 -0.25 0.25 -0.29 0.08
Building Has 10-19 Units 0.55 0.58 -0.52 -0.08 -0.28 0.08
Building Has 20-49 Units -0.09 0.67 -0.28 -0.61 -0.28 0.01
Building Has 50+ Units 0.81 0.56 -0.05 -1.54 -0.28 0.07
Constant -1.43 -0.25 -0.82 0.36 0.09 0.30
All Changes Combined -4.33 -1.32
Note: This table describes how the parameters of the heating-system choice model change across time in the alternative
counterfactual that exploits the fact that price regulation applied only to interstate sales and thus states that were
net exporters of natural gas were not subject to price ceilings (see section 6.6 for details). For each decade, the table
reports the change in parameter estimates relative to the baseline in which parameters are not allowed to vary across
decades, as well as the implied changes in average annual physical shortages (in percentage points) and allocative costs
(in billions). We do not display results for the 1950s because not all of the covariates are observed, making the results
incompatible with other decades. In the baseline speciﬁcation for net exporters average annual physical shortages are
21.1% and average annual allocative cost is $9.62 billion.
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